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I. INTRODUCTION
The project to restate the law of torts offers a number of op-
portunities.' One is law reform, as the last two Restatements con-
* Professor of Law, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.
B.Sc., 1974, University of New South Wales; Ph.D., 1977, University of Adelaide; LL.B., 1981,
Australian National University; D. Phil., 1984 University of Oxford. I am grateful to the mem-
bers of the Chicago-Kent Law School and to the Wade Conference attendees for many productive
discussions. Numerous earlier scholars addressed topics in this Paper, and I am indebted to
much of their work. Especial thanks is due to Professor Tony Honor6 and Professor Richard
Wright. Our many conversations helped me clarify many of my ideas and important differences
between their well-known approaches to this area and my own. I am most grateful for their
patience and intellectual generosity.
Key sections of the research for this Article were carried out at the University of Texas
School of Law. I thank most warmly the Dean, Professor William Powers, Jr., and faculty mem-
bers for their congenial hospitality. I am particularly grateful to Professor Roy M. Mersky, Di-
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cerning products liability illustrate. 2 Another is to reflect on doc-
trinal history, both in the case law and in the academy.3 Yet an-
other, and the one I focus on, is the opportunity to clarify legal con-
cepts, if necessary by reformulation and restructuring, in order to
assist courts to manage new challenges that have emerged since the
last Restatement. Few areas in the law of tort are in more need of
this re-evaluation than the area covered by the term "legal cause"
as described in the earlier Restatements, where its treatment is
opaque, confused, and contradictory. Perhaps even more impor-
rector of Research at the Tarlton Law Library, and his excellent staff for their assistance in
using their outstanding collection.
1. Besides the obvious purpose of encouraging state jurisdictions to "fly in formation" for
the sake of a national economy, a more Machiavellian purpose might be to restate legal princi-
ples so broadly that, behind this appearance of a national legal culture described at a high level
of abstraction, diverse local legal cultures can still flourish.
2. See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087 (2000); Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles'Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265
(1994); Jane Stapleton, Restatement (Third) of Torts. Products Liability, an Anglo-Australian
Perspective, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 363, 371-72 (2000); Note, Just 1171at You'd Expect- Professor
Henderson's Redesign of Products Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2366 (1998).
3. For a magisterial study of the doctrinal history of the field covered by legal cause, see
generally Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present
Darkness, 69 WASH. U. LQ. 49 (1991). For the work of major modern causal theorists, see gen-
erally ILLA. HART & TONY HONOId, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1984); Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Causation]; Richard W.
Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics and Proof- Pruning the
Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001 (1988) [hereinafter Wright,
Clarifying the Concepts].
Many other illuminating modern comments on specific legal cause issues have been written.
See generally David A. Fischer, Products Liabilit-Proximate Cause, Intervening Cause, and
Duty, 52 Mo. L. REV. 547 (1987); William J. Powers, Cardozo: A Study in Reputology, 12
CARDozo L. REv. 1941, 1951-52 (1991) [hereinafter Powers, Reputology] (discussing the role of
Palsgraf in the eclipse of the earlier pseudo-scientific metaphors of legallproximate cause); Wil-
liam J. Powers, Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1701-04
(1997) [hereinafter, Powers, Judge and Jury] (discussing the duty versus proximate cause debate
between Leon Green and Dean Keeton); David %V. Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon
Green, 56 TEX. L. REV. 393, 403-12 (1977) (describing Green's "almost monomaniacal focus on the
bundle of confusions that traveled under the label 'proximate cause' "); David W. Robertson,
Negligence Liability for Crines and Intentional Torts Committed by Others, 67 TUL L REV. 135,
138 (1992) [hereinafter Robertson, Negligence Liability] (urging that the duty and legal cause
issues separate to promote clarity).
For lawyer-economists' approaches to the area, see generally Guido Calabresi, Concerning
Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Mark
F. Grady, Proxinate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363 (1984); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
109 (1983); Mario J. Rizzo, The Imputation Theory of Proximate Cause: An Economic Framework,
15 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1981); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability
in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980). Compare Richard V. Wright, Actual Causation
vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985) with
Robert Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on Causation, 63 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 523 (1987).
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tantly, legal cause is especially ripe for reconsideration in light of
its complementary relationship with concepts that define the inci-
dence of the relevant tort obligation, such as the duty concept in the
tort of negligence. As the reach of such incidence-defining concepts
shifts, so too will the reach of the concept of legal cause. 4
This Article has three main themes. First, earlier Restate-
ments took as their paradigm of a negligence claim one where the
careless (positive) act of a private defendant results in physical in-
jury to the plaintiff, such as when I carelessly run over a stranger
with my car breaking her leg. But such claims, which I call "tradi-
tional" cases or "simple running down" cases, are not the most im-
portant in the challenges they present to modern tort doctrine. Of
much greater significance are non-traditional claims, such as those
alleging a negligent failure to control a third party, which test the
limits of the contours of the map of torts. The Restatement (Third)
of Torts ("Restatement (Third)") should squarely address the chal-
lenge non-traditional claims pose to earlier dogmas such as the
general duty owed to the whole world and the implicit assumption
that a defendant will be liable for a consequence of tortious conduct
unless, exceptionally, a rule restricting liability operates.
Secondly, earlier Restatements are coy about the institu-
tional competition between judge and jury that underlies doctrinal
arrangements. Yet often the relationship of duty and legal cause is
something akin to a seesaw. Often there is a choice to package a
particular issue as one of duty, and therefore one for the court, or
as one of legal cause, and therefore one for the jury, with a resul-
tant empowering of one of these institutions at the expense of the
other. Even where there is, as I suggest there should be, a move
towards spelling out the detailed legal concerns that arise out of the
particular facts of the case and bear on jury determinations, such a
move might be characterized as empowering courts relative to the
status quo. The Restatement (Third) should admit frankly the po-
litical dimension to possible doctrinal arrangements.
Thirdly, the treatment of causation in earlier Restatements is
incoherent. In places, there is the claim that causation in law is a
pure question of fact, yet elsewhere this approach is betrayed by a
reliance on the way the word is used "in the popular sense, in which
4. Thus, if no-duty rules are recognized in relation to the control of third parties, the role of
legal cause is ousted. Conversely, where no-duty rules are denied in relation to the control of
third parties, the spotlight shifts to legal cause to determine how far liability will stretch down
the stream of consequences of the defendanes failure to control.
944 [Vol. 54:3:941
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there always lurks the idea of responsibility." The Restatement
(Third) should ensure that causation in law is a pure question of
fact. It can accomplish this by both defining "cause-in-fact" in terms
of factors that have played a role in the history of the relevant out-
come, and asking this historical role question in relation to the de-
fendant's alleged tortious conduct rather than his or her mere con-
duct. Remaining issues on which normative judgments need to be
made, such as the appropriate approach to the characteristic prob-
lem in cases of over-determination (multiple sufficient historical
factors), should then be handled under a second analytical element
governing the appropriate "scope of liability for consequences of tor-
tious conduct." The obfuscating terminology of legal cause, proxi-
mate cause, and substantial factor should be replaced by these two
elements, which directly reflect the two enquiries, one factual and
one normative, that underlie the current area described as legal
cause. The Restatement (Third) can then proceed to set out the
rules and legal concerns that bear on evidentiary gaps relating to
cause-in-fact, and the rules and legal concerns that bear on the
question of the appropriate scope of liability for consequences under
the particular tort in the particular circumstances.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF NON-TRADITIONAL CLAIMS IN
NEGLIGENCE
The Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Second)")
reflected the dominant academic fashions of the time. In the tort of
negligence, these included a skepticism about the role of the duty
concept 6 and a preference for jury judgment.7 The associated em-
brace of a general duty owed "to the whole world '8 left most issues
to be dealt with under the rubric of the other recognized elements of
the tort, including "legal cause."9 Whether or not the academic
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt a (1965); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431
cmt. a (1934); see discussion infra note 82.
6. For a sustained assault on this general orthodoxy, see generally John C. P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral ofMacPherson, 146 U. PA. L REV. 1733 (1998).
7. Powers, Judge and Jury, supra note 3, at 1702-04 (regarding Dean Keeton's preference
for jury judgment/power prevailing over the views of Leon Green on this point).
8. The Restatement (Second) gives as an example of an occasion where legal protection is
accorded as "against the whole world" the negligent invasion of bodily security. "every man has a
right, as against every other, not to have his interest in bodily security invaded" in this manner.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. d; see also RESTATEMENT OFTORTS § 1 cmt. d.
9. The relevant treatment of legal cause is contained in the first two "pamphlets" of the




fashion has changed since 1965, it is certainly the case that the
pressures on courts and legal doctrine have shifted dramatically.
The emergence of a large, nation-wide, entrepreneurial, and intel-
lectually inventive plaintiffs' bar hastened the exposure of the in-
trinsically voracious nature of the negligence principle, 10 putting
pressure on court dockets and, of principal relevance here, on the
assumption that liability could be adequately contained in the con-
text of a recognized general duty.
Interestingly, a parallel challenge has emerged in foreign
common law jurisdictions even though most lack the potent mix of a
large aggressive plaintiffs' bar, contingency fees, and jury trial.
Over the past couple of decades, the appellate courts in these juris-
dictions have faced a wave of non-traditional claims in the tort of
negligence. By a traditional claim I mean one in which the careless
(positive) act of a private defendant resulted in physical injury to the
plaintiff, as where the defendant carelessly ran over a stranger
with his/her car breaking the stranger's leg; where the defendant
carelessly discharged effluent into a river, physically injuring
swimmers downstream; or where the defendant carelessly manufac-
tured ginger-beer contaminated by a decomposing snail that poi-
sons a consumer. Hereafter I will call such a case "the traditional
case" or "the simple running down case." Modern non-traditional
claims do not fit this simple paradigm; they range from ones for
pure nervous shock or pure economic loss to a diverse range of
physical injury claims of affirmative duties (omission cases such as
an allegation of wrongful failure to control a third party) that have
proven particularly troublesome, especially when brought against
deep-pocketed public authorities.
Under the pressure of such non-traditional claims, the views
have crystallized in foreign common law jurisdictions that the neg-
ligence principle is one that requires tight and effective doctrinal
control, and that society simply cannot and should not require the
tort system to provide monetary compensation for every harm re-
sulting from carelessness, not even every physical harm."1 Priorities
10. See Jane Stapleton, Good Faith in Private Law, 52 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 28-31
(1999); Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menus, in THE LAW
OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CELEBRATION OF JOHN FLEMMING 59, 59-60 (Peter Cane & Jane
Stapleton eds., 1998) [hereinafter Stapleton, Judicial Menus]. For example, a plaintiff will often
be able to formulate a long list of omissions by others that she can plausibly allege to have
played a role in the history of her injury. See discussion infra note 58.
11. "The branch of English law which deals with civil wrongs abounds with instances of acts
and, more particularly, of omissions which give rise to no legal liability in the doer or emitter for
loss or damage sustained by others as a consequence of the act or omission, however reasonably
946 [Vol. 54:3:941
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must be chosen, and boundaries for the obligation of care must be
drawn by consideration of a variety of legal concerns, including dis-
tributive justice criteria. 12 The earlier emotional allure of a general
duty cut back only exceptionally on the basis of specific policy con-
siderations 3 has withered away in these jurisdictions. While these
or probably that loss or damage might have been anticipated." Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co.,
[19701 A-C. 1004, 1060 (ILL.) (Diplock, L).
12. Distributive justice, as I will use the term, is the quality claimed by theories which set
out how a resource should be distributed between parties, such as theories of taxation (flat-rate,
progressive, etc.) and theories of social security benefits. Corrective justice is the quality claimed
for theories about how disruptions to an initial distribution, such as exploitation of anothers
property, should be "corrected." A common law judgment that recognizes a new entitlement rule,
such as MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), seeks to justify a shift in
distribution and is therefore appropriately assessed in terms of theories of distributive justice.
Later moves that purport to "apply" the rule are appropriately assessed in terms of theories of
corrective justice.
Recently, distributive justice has been explicitly expounded as a factor relevant to the duty
question in major decisions by the House of Lords. For example, Lord Hoffmann in Wlhite L.
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, noted that recognition of a duty here "would be unac-
ceptable to the ordinary person because (though he might not put it this way) it would offend
against his notions of distributive justice." White v. Chief Constable of S. Yorkshire Police,
[1999] 2 A.C. 455, 510 (IL). It was also noted in McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board by Lord
Hope that recent cases on duty of care had been "informed by considerations of distributive jus-
tice. It was a practical attempt to preserve the general perception of the law as a system of rules
which is fair as between one citizen and another." McFarlane v. Tayside Health Bd., [2000] 2
A-C. 59, 96 (ILL.).
In the same case, Lord Steyn made these ringing statements about justice and the common
law:
It is my firm conviction that where courts of law have denied a remedy for the
cost of bringing up an unwanted child the real reasons have been grounds of
distributive justice. That is, of course, a moral theory. It may be objected that
the House must act like a court of law and not like a court of morals. That
would only be partly right. The court must apply positive law. But judges'
sense of the moral answer to a question, or the justice of the case, has been one
of the great shaping forces of the common law. What may count in a situation
of difficulty and uncertainty is not the subjective view of the judge but what he
reasonably believes that the ordinary citizen would regard as right ... . [In
White,] Lord Hoffmann and I reasoned that it would be morally unacceptable if
the law denied a remedy to bereaved relatives ... but granted it to police offi-
cers who were on duty. Lord Hoffmann expressly invoked considerations of dis-
tributive justice .... Lord Browne-Wilkinson and I expressed agreement with
this reasoning .... The truth is that tort law is a mosaic in which the principles
of corrective justice and distributive justice are interwoven. And in situations
of uncertainty and difficulty a choice sometimes has to be made between the
two approaches ....
Relying on principles of distributive justice I am persuaded that our tort law
does not permit parents of a healthy unwanted child to claim the costs of
bringing up the child from a health authority or a doctor. If it were necessary
to do so, I would say that the claim does not satisfy the requirement of being
fair, just and reasonable.
Id. at 82-83; see also Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrcctive Justice, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 138 (1999).
13. Such an approach famously was set out in the United Kingdom in Dorset Yacht Co.,
[1970] A..C. 1004 (H.L.) and somewhat notoriously in Arms v. Merton London Borough, [1978]
A-C. 728 (ILL.). Even in the former era there were warnings at the highest appellate levels "as
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 54:3:941
foreign courts continue to accept that a duty is owed in the tradi-
tional case of the running down of an absolute stranger, 14 in all
other contexts they insist on being positively persuaded that the
law should recognize a particularized or "relational" duty between
the parties. 5
In short, in these other common law jurisdictions, the "map"
of the incidence of the tort of negligence is now viewed as consisting
not merely of the continent of obligation in the traditional running
down-type case. Elsewhere on that map there is a vast ocean of
freedom from liability for one's unreasonable and injurious behav-
ior, dotted with much smaller carefully charted islands of non-
traditional duties. 16 As appellate courts in these foreign common
to not extending the nursemaid school of negligence." Savory v. Holland & Hannan & Cubitts
(S.) Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 1158, 1166 (1964) (Diplock, L.) (cited with approval in Makepeace v. Evans
Brothers).
14. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Hong Kong Ltd. v. Hong Kong United Dockyards Ltd., [1991] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 309, 328-29 (P.C.) (Brandon, L.); Murphy v. Brentwood Dist. Council, [1991] 1 A.C.
398, 486-87 (H.L.) (Oliver, L.); Stapleton, Judicial Menus, supra note 10, at 72. The legal rea.
soning in these foreign common law jurisdictions could not, therefore, be accommodated
smoothly within either the thesis promoted by Goldberg and Zipursky that duty is always rela-
tional, or in their words is "analytically relational," Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, or the
approach to duty reflected in Professor Schwartz's 1999 Draft with its focus on the non-relational
"continent' of obligation recognized in traditional cases, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Discussion Draft Apr. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
15. This is often cryptically summarized in terms of a duty not being recognized until the
court has been positively convinced that, in light of the balance of legal concerns, it is "just and
reasonable" to recognize it. See supra note 12 (dictum of Lord Steyn). Goldberg and Zipursky
seem to fall into a fallacy similar to that of the orthodox tort scholars they criticize by assuming
that the issue of whether or not we should think in terms of a universal duty is inexorably linked
to the issue of the validity of the use in legal reasoning of concerns couched in the language of
rights. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6. But we need not inevitably accept the Realists'
linking of duty-skepticism with rights-skepticism (the functionalist restriction of duty analysis to
arguments couched as policy). My own view is that, in traditional "running down" cases, duty is
non-relational: Courts do not require any relation between defendant and plaintiff. But in non-
traditional cases, the law recognizes duty only where there is some prior definable non-universal
relation between either plaintiff and defendant or, for example in some cases of failure to control,
between the defendant and the third party. To put this another way, in non-traditional cases
duties are particularized, and this particularization of duties is couched in relational terms.
Yet, given the explicit content of real-world reasoning in court judgments, I also subscribe to
the view that the various legal concerns that influence common law courts when deciding
whether or not to recognize an incidence of legal obligation (such as a duty of care in a non-
traditional negligence case) range from those most conveniently/convincingly described as in-
strumentalist "policy" concerns, to those best described in terms of moral responsibility/right.
See, e.g., infra notes 17, 112 (regarding the rationale for the exculpation in law of the passive
stranger faced with the drowning infant); infra notes 85, 88, 90, & 112 (regarding the connection
between great-great-grandmother of Lee Harvey Oswald with the death of President John Ken.
nedy); supra note 12 (regarding even distributive justice).
16. Elsewhere I have coined the phrase "pockets" of duty. Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care: A
Wider Agenda, 107 L.Q. REV. 249 (1991) [hereinafter Stapleton, Wider Agenda]; Jane Stapleton,
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law jurisdictions spend most of their time in tort cases charting
these high seas of freedom from duties of care, this freedom is no
longer regarded as exceptional. Indeed, it tends to be the main fo-
cus of academics and practitioners who are becoming at least as
sensitive to the powerful legal concerns that weigh against the rec-
ognition of a duty17 as they once were to the powerful pro-liability
ideas behind the simple legal response to the traditional running
down case. Finally, there is now a general view that there is no sin-
gle "test" that can be used to deduce where it would be appropriate
for the law to recognize a duty of care in these non-traditional
cases. To search for such a test in dicta, such as those contained in
Heaven v. Pender'8 or Donoghue v. Stevenson,19 is now widely recog-
nized as futile. 20
It is a significant feature of the controls on negligence liabil-
ity emerging in foreign common law systems that virtually all have
been discussed and decided in the language of a denial of duty,
rather than a denial of tortious conduct or in terms of the local
equivalent of "legal cause."21 At this point, it is worth digressing for
a moment to defend the role of duty and other analytical elements
of the negligence cause of action. It is true that the title of an ana-
lytical element such as duty or legal cause may have been abused
by some courts as a mere empty label for the assertion, rather than
detailed rationalization, of a decision. In particular, it may well be
that many recent United States decisions of no-duty have been
thinly reasoned. But that does not establish that the concept is
without use. It does not show that the analytical element cannot be
Pure Economic Loss: A Judicial Exemplar, in GERARD V. LA FOREST AT THE SUPREI1E COURT OF
CANADA 1985-1997, at 449 (2000).
17. For example, there must be an extremely powerful and central libertarian principle at
work to justify the law not imposing a duty on the stranger to rescue the toddler drowning in a
puddle at his feet. It would be very odd and unconvincing to dismiss this result merely as some
exceptional policy.generated immunity, rather than as a crystalline vindication of a broad-
ranging and fundamental right of the stranger (that he or she is free to decide on his or her
commitments to strangers even if that clashes with a collective goal).
18. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (Eng. C.A. 1883).
19. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (ELL).
20. To pursue a single formulaic "short-cut" test for the duty of care in non.traditional cases
is simply to pursue a "will-o-the-wisp," to use Lord Oliver's apt phrase. Se Caparo Indus. v.
Dickman, 11990] 2 A.C. 605, 633 (ILL).
21. In the United Kingdom and Australasia. the elements covered by legal cause are cov-
ered by "causation in fact" and "remoteness of damage," though there is just as much vagueness
and confusion in the area as there is in the United States. For example, a freakish intervention
after the defendant's tortious conduct is sometimes treated as "truncating' the "chain of causa-
tion" so that the plaintiff is told she has failed even to establish causation. In other cases it is
treated as rendering the damage "too remote," even though "caused" by the tortious conduct.
2001]
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made to do work, to display a particular reasoned message, of prac-
tical use to society.22 These particular messages might be stated as:
0 The incidence of the duty of care:23 recognition that, in
light of systemic concerns 24 relating to the situation in
which the defendant conducted himself,25 the defendant
is obliged to conduct himself as a reasonable person
would. These systemic concerns of the law might be quite
general or they might be quite specific to the facts, for
example, that denial of a duty would tend to discourage
rescue or encourage abortion in the circumstances.
22. See Leon Green, Tort Law: Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959) (stating
that the functions of legal doctrine "are primarily those of communication"). One could, of course
collapse all the elements of the tort of negligence into one amorphous unstructured proposition of
law: that in the circumstances the defendant owed this plaintiff a duty of reasonable care not to
cause the particular outcome of which the plaintiff complains. But this merges, and therefore
dulls to the point of uselessness, any specific messages about, and themes within, the underlying
legal concerns influencing the outcome of the case. Moreover, it does not help people understand,
and to the extent possible, be guided by the law. See discussion infra note 142. Finally, recogni.
tion of the utility of the duty category does not depend on an embrace of rights-based reasoning.
Compare Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, with supra note 15 (argument in first paragraph).
23. By the "incidence" of an obligation I adopt the following, non-Realist, meaning: the con-
texts in which, were a defendant to have appropriate legal advice, he could be advised before he
conducted himself that he owed "such and such" a legal obligation. In the tort of negligence, I
describe the map of such incidence of obligation in terms of a continent of the obligation to take
care (representing the traditional "running down" cases), and a sea of freedom from the obliga-
tion of care dotted with "islands" of duty in non-traditional cases.
24. For my explanation of the utility of the duty concept in these terms, see Jane Stapleton,
Duty of Care Peripheral Parties and Alternative Means of Deterrence, 111 L.Q. REV. 301, 303.05,
315-16 (1995) [hereinafter Stapleton, Peripheral Parties]. Some of these concerns will, on the
facts, support the imposition of a duty others will, on the facts, support its denial. For examples
of dozens of both, see Stapleton, Judicial Menus, supra note 10, at 59, where I explain, for exam-
ple, how in one context the law's concern not positively to encourage abortion weighs against the
recognition of a duty of care, and in another context the same concern weighs in favor of such a
recognition. My limited review of the foreign case law found only two legal concerns that act as a
"trump," that is, when present, the factor secures a particular answer to the duty question.
First, it is (in the absence of state immunity) always judged that the proper vindication of the
law's concern with the physical security of persons and property justifies a duty being recognized
on a party by whose careless (positive) act the plaintiffs person or property has been physically
damaged. Secondly, it is always judged that the proper vindication of the law's concern with the
liberty of the individual justifies a refusal to recognize any duty of affirmative action towards a
complete stranger.
For an excellent recent Canadian example of this type of "legal concerns" type of duty rea-
soning in the judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada, see Winnipeg Child & Family Services
v. G., [1998] 152 D.L.R. (4th) 193.




" Tortious conduct (e.g., breach of duty in the tort of negli-
gence): a finding that the defendant did not conduct him-
self as a reasonable person would have under the par-
ticular circumstances.
* Legal cause: that his tortious conduct was part of the his-
tory of the injurious outcome of which the plaintiff com-
plains; and that this outcome was within the appropriate
"scope of liability for consequences" under the relevant
rule in the circumstances of the case. The role of the lat-
ter in defining and confining liability is critical in every
legal obligation.26 Even in traditional running down
cases, where liability is not confined by using the duty
concept, control is essential because it would be intoler-
able for a person to be held liable for all the consequences
of his tortious conduct, even just for all the physical con-
sequences. Moreover, a separate notion of the appropriate
"scope of liability for consequences" allows the law to
highlight and apply distinctions, not only between liabil-
ity for outcomes of tortious conduct occurring at different
times, but between liability for contemporaneous injuri-
ous outcomes, an apportionment that may well not be as
convincingly achievable under any other element of the
cause of action.27
Let us return to the question of why the controls on negli-
gence liability emerging in foreign common law systems have de-
ployed the language of a denial of duty, rather than a denial of tor-
tious conduct or "legal cause." In some cases, this choice of concep-
tual packaging is virtually dictated by the circumstances of the
case. Consider the law's refusal to impose liability on the person
who fails to rescue a stranger-infant drowning in a puddle at his
feet. This could not convincingly be presented in terms of non-
tortious conduct, that is of the person having acted "reasonably" or
26. Since the areas covered by the term "legal cause" are common to all torts (indeed, to all
obligations), the Restatenent (Third) should set out general sections on these matters before
dealing with the specific rules in relation to the different torts such as negligence and deceit. In
contrast, the treatment of the area in the Restatement (Second) discusses "legal cause" in detail
in relation to the tort of negligence, and these provisions are then obscurely extended to other
torts by a mere comment in one section. See infra notes 72-74 (citing Restatement (Second)).
27. See infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
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in line with "the community's accepted way of doing things. ' 28 The
result can only be presented in no-duty terms.
But sometimes the court has a choice of conceptual packag-
ing. For example, foreign systems might have chosen to impose the
relational, temporal, and spatial controls on liability for pure nerv-
ous shock under the legal cause concept. 29 But instead they chose
the duty concept. Another important area where there seems to be a
choice of packaging is where the complaint is of a wrongful failure
to control the conduct of a third party (including the positive facili-
tation of such conduct described by Professor Rabin as "enabling
torts" 30 ). There again, the preference abroad tends to be for the no-
duty vehicle.
There are two reasons for these choices that are relevant to
my topic. First, these courts correctly saw the advantage of the duty
packaging in sending a powerful systemic message. This is some-
thing that treatment under other more case-specific concepts such
as legal cause could not provide.31 For example, it allows a court
boldly to signal that it will never impose liability for pure nervous
shock unless the plaintiff witnessed a trauma or its immediate af-
28. Note the suggestion by Professor Kelley that the mapping of the incidence of legal duties
can be helpfully assisted by a consideration of such "social duties associated with a community's
coordinating conventions or practices." Kelley, supra note 3, at 87; see also Patrick J. Kelley,
Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
315, 353-63 (1990). There is, however, an important point here about current conventions set-
ting a maximum outer limit of tort liability in order that "pace-setting" standards are not im-
posed that might offend the requirement that the gist of the tort of negligence is "damage" to
one's normal expectancies: If the social convention was that lifeguards never attempted to rescue
children whose parents were nearby, a legal duty of affirmative action to do so would make such
drowning children better off than they would have otherwise been! See Jane Stapleton, The
Normal Expectancies Measure in Tort Damages, 113 L.Q. REV. 257, 275-282 (1997).
29. That is, this occurs under the foreign equivalent of this part of legal cause, known in the
United Kingdom, for example, as "remoteness of damage."
30. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 435 (1999). Of course, Rabin's
definition of "in the enabling situations ... defendant had affirmatively enhanced the risk of
harm," id. at 442, hinges on a prior determination of what were the normal expectancies of risk
the victim would otherwise have faced, Stapleton, supra note 28.
Note, however, that in the failure to control a third party area there may be sound legal rea-
sons for preferring the packaging of the "scope of liability for consequences" rather than "duty":
for example, to avoid distasteful classification of victims in relation to their protection from per-
sonal injuries in traditional cases. See discussion infra notes 33, 155. See generally Stapleton,
Peripheral Parties, supra note 24, at 310-17. For an important analysis of many American "fail-
ure to control cases," see Robertson, Negligence Liability, supra note 3. For key cases in the
United Kingdom, see Smith v. Littlewoods Organisations Ltd., [1987] 1 A.C. 241 (H.L.); Home
Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1060 (H.L.) (Diplock, L.).
31. Stapleton, Peripheral Parties, supra note 24, at 303-05, 315-16.
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termath,32 no matter how foreseeable and direct the risk of such
injury might have been. As in the United States, the principles so
far explicitly recognized as governing the equivalent of legal cause
are too few and too crude to accommodate the specific messages of
control that courts want to send in response to the highly diverse
non-traditional negligence claims they face. Secondly, in these jury-
free systems there is no cultural-constitutional price to be paid for
dealing with issues under duty rather than elsewhere.
III. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION
Since the 1964 adoption and 1965 publication of the relevant
sections on legal cause in the Restatement (Second), American
courts have faced even greater pressures associated with non-
traditional claims than courts in other jurisdictions. Relative to the
rest of the common law world, the intellectual inventiveness of
many American plaintiffs' lawyers, coupled with the willingness to
back it with their own financing, is remarkable. Since the negli-
gence principle invites invention, non-traditional claims have bur-
geoned in the United States, especially claims in the form of com-
plaints of failure to control a third party. Many American courts
now share the view that liability for harm resulting from careless-
ness in non-traditional cases can and should, at most, be limited to
what I have elsewhere called "pockets" or "islands" of duty: that the
negligence principle requires clear and tight control. But in the
United States, the control of liability in non-traditional negligence
claims by means of no-duty rules is significantly constrained.
There are the constraints that also operate in foreign com-
mon law systems. For example, if a court chooses to deal with an
issue as one of duty so that it can use the no-duty strategy, this will
tend to select the precedents with which their treatment should
synchronize, namely earlier judgments concerning the duty issue.
Sometimes this is awkward because the precedents under a differ-
ent conceptual element of the tort provide a more convincing "fit"
with the facts of the case. Similarly, by choosing the no-duty strat-
egy of control, the court is also choosing to send a powerful systemic
message. Again, this strategy may be constrained in certain situa-
32. Another signal, with which we are so familiar we scarcely notice it, is that there is no
duty under the tort of negligence to avoid carelessly interfering with another by means of noise,
light, or vibration. Contrast this with the tort of nuisance.
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tions where such a powerful no-duty message is judged distasteful
or dangerous.33
But there are important additional constraints on the no-
duty strategy of control that are specific to the jury-based system of
United States tort law. First, identifying issues as ones of duty ren-
ders them issues of law for the court and not "issues of fact" for the
jury.34 To the extent that juries hitherto handled such issues as
"questions of fact," say of breach or legal cause, the strategy results
in a power shift from juries to the court. Since "rules of law" gov-
erning breach or legal cause are rare, the issue goes straight to the
33. For example, in jurisdictions that allow negligence claims by employees against employ-
ers, to justify the denial of liability on the basis that the employer owed no duty to the employee
in the circumstances might well be regarded as provocative in the light of the past struggle by
workers for health and safety at work. Similarly, to purport to justify the denial of the liability
of a school to one of its pupils physically injured at the school on the basis that no duty was owed
might also be regarded as risking a distasteful and perhaps dangerous message.
The possible distastefulness of a no-duty message is also an objection that can be made to
Cardozo's controversial judgment in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
The judgment may not be objectionable because it found no liability, nor because it recognized
that the issue in the case was one of law rather than fact. But Cardozo's choice of packaging his
reasons in terms of "no duty" seems distasteful to us because in this traditional case (i.e., of
physical injury resulting from the positive act of the defendant) it sends the systemic message
that there are circumstances where one citizen does not owe a duty of care not to break another
citizen's leg and so on. This callous message unacceptably appears to rank different classes of
citizens in relation to their entitlements to protection from having their legs broken by dofen.
dants. See supra note 30; infra notes 122, 155. These disadvantages are avoided by packaging
the no-liability result in terms of the characterization of the injury, not the victim: Each citizen
owes a duty of care (to act as a reasonable person) where there is (as there virtually always is) a
foreseeable risk that his positive act might cause physical injury to others (the general duty of
care owed to all in the traditional case), but the scope of that obligation does not extend to all
physical consequences of the tortious conduct. This reformulation of the result in the case from
one in terms of no-duty to one in terms of the injury falling outside the scope of the appropriate
scope of liability for consequences allows a shift of focus from distinguishing between victims to
distinguishing between consequences.
In non-traditional contexts (that is, contexts other than the entitlement not to suffer physical
injury by the positive act of another) such as cases of pure economic loss and mental injury, we
may not have such an objection, or at least not so strong an objection, to ranking the entitle-
ments to protection according to the classification of the victim. Here no-duty distinctions be-
tween classes of citizens seem much more acceptable. For example, victims suffering from psy-
chological injury being distinguished merely on the basis of family relationship, etc.
The acceptability of no-duty controls fluctuates. For example, consider the U-turn of the
California Supreme Court analyzed in Stephen D. Sugaman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers:
Recent California Experience with "New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328B cmt. b. (1965) ("In general, the court must do-
cide questions of law, and the jury questions of fact. But since a question of law may involve a
ruling upon a question of fact, and a question of fact may involve the application of a rule of law,
the two are often interwoven, and it becomes impossible to state the function of the court without
reference to that of the jury, and vice versa."); Powers, Judge and Jury, supra note 3, at 1704,
1711-12 (discussing this and other aspects of the judge/jury institutional competition such as the
following point about the standard of review).
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jury. Representatives of plaintiffs' interests will tend to oppose this
potential increase in trial courts' power, and such opposition con-
strains American courts' adoption of the no-duty strategy with its
associated stripping out of issues from concepts such as legal cause.
Secondly, when we choose to identify issues as ones of duty, this
has a direct impact on the vulnerability to review of trial outcomes.
If one chooses to designate an issue as a "question of fact" for the
jury (in theory, an evidence-influenced one for the jury), to be de-
cided without the giving of reasons, one is also thereby choosing a
very high threshold for appellate review. Conversely, by designat-
ing an issue as one of duty, one is choosing to allow a greater scope
of review. Plaintiffs oppose the latter potential effect of the no-duty
strategy of control of liability, and this in turn generates another
"political" constraint on its adoption by United States courts.
This "institutional competition" between the court and the
jury forms the critical backdrop to any restatement of the law that
lurks behind the tag of legal cause. So a Restatement (Third) that
does not explicitly approach the area in these terms will be inade-
quate. It is becoming evident to more American courts that liability
in non-traditional cases must be confined. This is exposing the ten-
sion inherent in the United States system between an historical, or
at least rhetorical, respect for jury decision-making and the concern
that, to be most effective, control of liability should be defined
sharply, in fine detail and, to the extent possible, it should be se-
cured by precedent. Even those who do not trust juries must con-
cede that, given the constraints on the no-duty strategy, there will
be cases in which any control must be located under elements of the
tort where juries decide the issue, such as tortious conduct (e.g.
breach of a duty) and legal cause, where there are extremely few
constraining rules of law. But while a British trial judge who deliv-
ers a no-liability result in terms of (the local equivalent of) legal
cause must give at least some structured reasons in line with, and
perhaps generating, precedent,35 a United States jury provides
none.
How, then, can control be facilitated and even encouraged
within these jury-judged elements of the tort? Given the high
threshold for the reviewability of jury decisions on issues of "fact,"
35. I do not want, however, to suggest that British, Australasian, and Canadian judges in-
variably follow this rigorous route. There are regrettably quite a few judgments which merely
assert that the defendant's tortious conduct was or was not a cause of the injury, that an inter-




the best opportunity for structured control here is the explicit
enunciation, with far greater clarity than they have been in earlier
Restatements, not only of the few crystallized rules of law governing
cause in fact and the scope of liability for consequences (the two
elements of the amalgam concept of legal cause), but also of the di-
verse legal concerns relevant to the normative judgment of the facts
by the decision-maker within the leeway of those rules of law. In
any individual case, counsel for the parties could then address the
jury, and trial judges instruct the jury, on those of these rules and
concerns that arise as relevant from the facts.
Would this have any effect? Certainly, given the nature of
jury trial procedures and so on, it is both logically untenable as well
as politically unacceptable in our legal systems to treat the jury as
an uneducatable "black-box." It is also implausible. For us to rely
only on the jurisprudence underlying directed verdicts in favor of
defendants in order to control liability is unnecessarily defeatist.
There is no convincing evidence that American juries in general are
running wild, or that they are impervious to reasoned argument.
This means that open argument before and instruction to juries
about the legal concerns arising from the facts of the case should
succeed in going some way to enlightening jury members about the
limited purposes of, and arguments countervailing to, liability in
non-traditional claims of negligence. It would encourage them to
see their judgment of the individual case in the wider context. Even
though the end determination of cause in fact and the scope of li-
ability for consequences are jury matters, and formally "questions
of fact," appeal to a higher court would still be feasible on the basis
that the trial judge did not adequately focus the jury's attention on
all relevant legal concerns arising on the facts. Indeed, appellate
courts have a central role to play in encouraging trial courts to
abandon the current cryptic formulaic jury instructions concerning
cause in fact and the scope of liability for consequences in favor of a
more comprehensible rehearsal of the competing legal concerns that
underlie the dispute between the parties on these issues.
All common law systems are marred by the crudity of their
legal cause (or equivalent) concept. All would benefit from the elu-
cidation of the questions that are in dispute in cases formulated in
terms of legal cause. But I have suggested an American-specific
reason why the Restatement (Third) needs to pay special attention
to the clarification of the principles in this area of the law. This
reason is that, in many cases, legal cause may prove to be the only
context in which critical control can be exercised to contain the vo-
raciousness of the negligence principle within tolerable bounds. At
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the very least, the unpacking of the underlying questions in dispute
in the area, plus the relevant legal concerns enunciated by courts,
should encourage a more informed debate about whether a specific
issue could or should be allocated as a question of law for the court,
or kept as a "question of fact" embedded in the jury determination.
In short, I am not advocating that liability in non-traditional
cases should be tightly confined. I am asserting that it has to be
confined as a matter of common sense, and that that control should
follow a rational debate about the reasons for and against duty in a
particular case, if that is the locus chosen for control, and for and
against a particular scope of liability for consequences, if that is the
preferred analytical formulation for the facts of the case.
IV. UNPACKING THE CATCHMENT OF LEGAL CAUSE: THE
Two UNDERLYING ENQUIRIES
Legal cause is defined in the earlier Restatements as an
amalgam of elements, 36 but it is an incoherent amalgam. Outside
the Restatements, courts used and continue to use other terms in
this area that do not have a single agreed meaning. For example,
the most important of these, "proximate cause,"37 is sometimes used
in a sense synonymous with the area covered by legal cause in ear-
lier Restatements and sometimes used in a more limited sense. Less
appreciated is the ambiguity that can arise with the use of the
terms "cause-in-fact" and "factual causation," particularly in the
courts' responses to the problem characteristically presented by
over-determined events.38 At the heart of this terminological confu-
36. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 9 cmt. b (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9
cmt. b. See generally infra Part VII.
37. The exact term "proximate cause" was not used by Prosser in the Second Restatement,
though it was used by contemporaneous courts. See infra note 78.
38. Over-determined events are ones with multiple sufficient historical factors, such as the
death in the double-hit hunters case: Two hunters, X and Y, carelessly shoot into a wood, both
bullets hitting the victim, either being sufficient to kill. The definition of the event determines
whether it attracts the characterization of an "over-determined" event: Had the event in the
double-hit hunters case been defined as "death by two bullets in the brain" the event would not
have been over-determined. See infra text accompanying note 50. For an appreciation of the
normative nature of the challenge over-determined events pose for the legal system, Professor
David Fischer provides an excellent series of articles. David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in
Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 1384 [hereinafter Fischer, Omission Cases] CSearch-
ing for the definition of the word 'cause' simply cannot provide the answer."); David A. Fischer,
Causation in Fact in Product Liability Failure to Warn Cases, 17 J. PRODS. & TOXICS LIAB. 271,
281-83 (1995) [hereinafter Fischer, Failure to Warn Cases]; David A. Fischer, Successive Causes
and the Enignma of Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L REV. 1127 (1999).
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sion are the shifting uses made both in ordinary life and in legal
discourse of the term "causation."
Yet this is not a hopeless situation. It is possible to cut
through these soft terms and to map, in non-causal language, the
terrain over which they wander so confusingly. That terrain com-
prises the two principal and distinct enquiries that can be made
about a transition to an outcome. 39
A. First Enquiry: Playing a Role in the History of the Outcome; the
"Targeted But-for" Test of Historical Involvement
First we might ask: How did the transition come about? Did
factor 40 X play a role in the history of the outcome? This is a ques-
tion of scientific fact to which there is only one correct answer,
though an infinite number of individual factors will satisfy it. If by
"causation" we only meant the phenomenon covered by this first
enquiry, then it would be true to say that "causation is a question of
fact." Chaos theory has revealed to us that many more factors pre-
ceding a transition to an outcome will have played a role in its his-
tory than our former understanding would have suggested. But it
remains true that, for any one outcome, there is an infinite number
of factors which simply played no role whatsoever in the history of
how the transition to that outcome came about. Even chaos theory
holds that the contemporaneous fluttering of a butterfly's wings in
the Upper Amazon played no role in the history of Mrs. Palsgraf's
injury.
Whatever the law means by the requirement that the tor-
tious conduct "cause" the injury of which legal complaint is made, it
means at least this: that it played a role in the history of the transi-
tion to that injury. But how can we test if a factor played a role in
the history of a transition? The lawyer's traditional but-for test, a
test of necessity, is notoriously inadequate for this purpose, as we
can see from over-determined events such as the following variant
on the facts of Summers v. Tice.41 Suppose that two hunters, X and
39. The sketch that follows in Parts V and VI builds on the analysis in my other works.
Jane Stapleton, Perspectives on Causation, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (Jeremy Hor-
der ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Series No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter Stapleton, Perspectives on Causa-
tion]; Jane Stapleton, Unpacking "Causation," in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY (Peter Cane &
Jeremy Gardner eds., forthcoming 2001) [Stapleton, Unpacking "Causation'l.
40. The notion of "factor" includes a state of affairs, such as the presence of gravity, and be-
havior or such as an act or an omission.




Y, carelessly shoot into a wood, both bullets hitting the victim, ei-
ther being sufficient to kill. Let's call this the "double hit hunters'
case." Here, if we use the but-for test to see if they played a role in
the history of the death, it would eliminate both hunters from the
enquiry. Yet the history of the victim's death is easy to write, and it
is obvious that both hunters played a role in it. It is clear, therefore,
that the traditional but-for test, the test of necessity, is not what
lies at the heart of our understanding of "playing a role in the his-
tory of an event." That is, it is not valid as a test of "cause-in-fact."
How then do we "test" whether a factor played a role in the
history of a transition? I suggest the following "targeted but-for
test," which builds on the "necessary element of a sufficient set"
approach of Hart, Honor6, and Wright, and reflects the methodol-
ogy of experimental science. 42 The long version of this is: take all
factors existing at the time of the actual transition, including the
factor that we are investigating, say the tortious conduct of hunter
X in the above example. If there is a notional sequence of removing
factors from that set such that
* a stage is reached where, given the remaining factors the
actual transition to the outcome might still have oc-
curred, but that
.0 the further removal of the targeted factor leaves a set
that would not (in the course of things that we now know
happened) have produced the transition,
42. H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honor4 formulated the notion of a necessary element of a suffi-
cient set (the NESS "test"), see HART & HONOR,, supra note 3, at 31, which was in turn elegantly
developed and popularized by Richard Wright, see Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1745-50;
Wright, Clarifying the Concepts, supra note 3, at 1018.42. These scholars describe NESS as a
test "of causation!' I believe that this is confusing. NESS is the correct approach to "historical
involvement." My targeted but-for test uses that approach but also emphasizes the multiple
perspectives that must be considered in applying NESS. In particular, the targeted but-for test
must be applied separately to every element of the defendant's tortious conduct. The scientific-
derived notion of historical involvement and the targeted but-for test of historical involvement
emphasize the processes that create the elements of the setting in which conduct is seen, the
various choices of perspective we have about how a piece of conduct might be viewed, and the
importance of irrevocably narrowing a victim's "expectancies." Stapleton, Perspecties on Causa-
tion, supra note 39, at 61-84; Stapleton, Unpacking "Causation," supra note 39.
For the purposes of this Article, I ignore two important variables that affect the answer to
the "historical involvement" question, Enquiry No. 1. The first is how the transitiontend
state/consequence is defined; or, to put it in recipe terms, what it is we are seeking the recipe for.
For the other principal variable, how the factor in issue is defined (in tort, how the alleged tor-
tious conduct is framed), see infra note 58.
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0 then the targeted factor played a role in the history of the
original transition. 43
One might crudely call this a test of sufficiency, but I prefer
to call it the "targeted but-for test '44 because, as the law tends to
do, it focuses on the role of one factor at a time and asks whether
there is some perspective from which that factor can be seen to
have "made a difference."
This reduces to a simple forensic test that allows the plain-
tiff to ignore multiple sufficient factors when proving that the de-
fendant's tortious conduct was historically relevant to the outcome.
For example, in the double hit hunters' case, the plaintiff can show
that the tortious conduct of hunter X satisfies this test of historical
involvement in the victim's death. This is because (a) by notionally
removing the tortious conduct of hunter Y, the set of remaining fac-
tors is such that the victim would still have died, but (b) the further
removal of the tortious conduct of hunter X leaves a set where the
victim would not have died. If there is no notional sequence that
shows the targeted factor making such a difference, as in the earlier
butterfly example, 45 then the factor (the butterfly) played no role in
the history of the transition.
43. The qualification of"mighe' is required because we are dealing with hypotheticals.
The only constraint on this test of historical involvement is that the plaintiff is not allowed to
remove a factor that had actually been present which had completely preempted the relevant
effect of the defendanes tortious conduct. For example, if D1 places a bomb under Vs car sot to
explode at Noon and D2 replaces it with another bomb set to explode at the same time, the plain-
tiff cannot ignore D2 (and thereby attempt to show that D1 played a role in the history of the
death) because the conduct of D2 completely terminated the relevant effect of Dl's tortious con-
duct. D1 is not historically involved in Vs subsequent death by explosion at noon. In contrast,
had D2 merely added his bomb to the scene, both D1 and D2 would have been historically in-
volved in Vs subsequent death by explosion at noon (this being a case parallel to that of the
double-hit hunters case).
Whether a factor is part of the history of a transition does not depend on whether a human
could have foreseen its association with the outcome. Foreseeability may, however, be regarded
as relevant to the second enquiry, depending on its purpose. For example, where the purpose of
the second enquiry is the application of legal rules, foreseeability may well be relevant depending
on the particular legal rule. See infra note 115.
44. Much scientific experimental design is based on a version of this "targeted but-for test."
A scientist will first define explicitly the parameters of the project, that is state formulations of
"factor" and "transition" that would otherwise be variables, see supra note 42, then carry out the
investigation by a series of experiments that strip out one by one the factors to be studied. In
theory, that is given an exhaustive set of such experiments, any over-determination will be re-
vealed.
45. In other words, there is no sequence of removing factors from the original scenario that
produces a set of factors that might still have produced the death, but in relation to which the




Of course, gravity also satisfies the targeted-but for test.46 So
too do the decisions of the hunters' great-great-grandmothers to
have children. But, then again, these factors are part of the full his-
tory of the transition to the outcome. Moreover, to play a role in
history, a factor does not have to be animate. A factor of human
conduct does not need to be voluntary, careless, or intentional, nor
need the person or anyone else be able to foresee the transition.
At its most curious, science is interested in the full list of
factors satisfying the criterion of historical involvement; until the
scientist selects a purpose for his or her enquiry,47 there is no basis
on which to narrow the focus of the investigation. We may be
stunned when lawyer-economists claim that the presence of the fe-
tus in the womb was as relevant to the history of the diethylstilbe-
strol ("DES") injuries as the manufacture and ingestion of the drug.
But the claim resonates as true, and this reflects the same point
that, until we choose the purpose of any more focussed enquiry,
there is no basis on which to emphasize one historical factor over
another.
Though this first, historical involvement, enquiry is a pure
question of fact, a system of justice must reach a final determina-
tion of such issues in circumstances of evidentiary uncertainty."
And so it is necessary for the law to choose rules by which this can
be done. In relation to this first enquiry, evidentiary gaps constitute
the pressure points for the law and where normative judgments are
required.49 In general, there are two types of evidentiary gaps here.
46. The accuracy with which we handle this criterion of historical involvement depends on
our ability to conceive of certain hypotheticals, certain imaginary alternative universes. In other
words, our capacity to appreciate that something played a role in history can be inaccurate be-
cause we lack relevant imagination. Plato may not have been able to conceive of a hypothetical
world without gravity, of a set of factors from which one could remove gravity. He would not
then have thought to consider whether gravity played a role in the history of the terrestrial proc-
esses he observed, though it did.
47. Sound scientific method requires the scientist to announce such a purpose and list the
assumptions being made and formulations adopted. See supra note 44.
48. Consider, in contrast, the repeated-sequence experiments scientists might be able to run
in order to fill in gaps. Of course, it is not just time and expense that prevents courts from doing
this: One cannot re-run cases involving human behavior.
49. Although foreseeability is irrelevant to Enquiry No. 1, it may well be a factor the law
regards as relevant to Enquiry No. 2. It may also be a factor the law regards as relevant to
whether the plaintiff is granted the benefit of any special legal rule created to assist with eviden-
tiary gaps. See infra note 53.
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1. Evidentiary Gaps Concerning Past Facts
In some cases, we simply do not know critical facts, or we do
not know them for certain. For example, in the "single hit hunters'
cases," such as Summers v. Tice,50 it could not be determined from
which hunter's gun the fatal bullet had come. In some of these
cases, the law has developed special rules to assist plaintiffs faced
with such an evidentiary gap.5 1 Sometimes, for example, proof that
the defendant by his or her tortious conduct foreseeably increased
the risk of an outcome5 2 may be sufficient to allow an inference that
the conduct did actually play a role in the history of that outcome.5 3
50. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (involving situation where only one bullet hit
the victim); see also Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137 (N.Y. 1919) (regarding multiple
possible sources of typhoid); Cook v. Lewis, [1952] D.L.R. 1 (involving another single-hit hunters'
case).
51. See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765,
1774-75 (1997). Regarding ideas for reform, see Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Cau.
sation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997).
It is significant that the multiple possible sufficient historic factors in Summers were all pieces of
tortious conduct (namely, all were breaches of a duty of care in the tort of negligence). Summers,
199 P.2d at 2-3; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965) ('Where the conduct
of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by
only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each
such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.")
Sometimes the reverse may, controversially, occur as when courts set the evidentiary barrier
at a particularly high level. For example, after the Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), some federal trial courts have been requiring
plaintiffs to adduce conclusive epidemiological evidence to bridge the evidentiary gap even
though this is unavailable and beyond the capacity of the plaintiff to collect or provide. Lucinda
M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their Euidentiary
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAuL L. REV. 335 (1999).
52. Alternatively, if there was no apparent background risk, proof that the tortious conduct
apparently created a risk will suffice. See infra note 135; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433B cmt. b., illus. 3.
53. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885); DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS 420-22 (2001) (citing articles and cases); Robertson, supra note 51, at 1774-75; see
also Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J.) (citing Sin.
dell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 43 A. 240 (Pa.
1899)); Calabresi, supra note 3. Such cases are examples of where, though foreseeability is ir-
relevant to the historical question of Enquiry No. 1, it may be relevant to the legal issue of
whether the assistance of some rule of law in relation to proof should be recognized. See supra
note 49.
In the United Kingdom, McGhee v. National Coal Board, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008 (H.L.), do-
spite considerable controversy, see Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Authority, [1988] 1 A.C. 1074
(H.L.), has recently been critical to the success of the largest personal injury claim in British
history, see the unreported judgment of Judge Turner in Griffiths v. British Coal Corp., decided
on January 23, 1998, by the Q.B.D. This judgment in turn led to a record settlement of£2 billion
for the benefit of 100,000 ex-pitmen. This sum, payable by the taxpayer, is more than the Con-
servative Government had received from the privatization of the coal industry and associated
asset sales. Seumas Milne, Miner's Payout is "a Debt" We Allow, GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Apr. 4,
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But sometimes this is not sufficient. 54 Sometimes the plaintiff
evades the evidentiary gap by reformulating the damage forming
the gist of the action to the loss of a chance to avoid that outcome, 55
but this is not uniformly allowed.
2. Evidentiary Gaps Concerning Targeted But-for; Hypotheticals
and the Dependence on the Alleged Tortious Conduct
In some cases, we know exactly what the past facts were but
we are uncertain whether the tortious conduct played any role in
the history of the plaintiffs injury. This is because we do not know
what would have happened in the hypothetical alternative universe
that we need to consider if we are to determine whether the tortious
conduct satisfies the targeted but-for test.56 For example, it may be
1999, at 10. So, at least in terms of socio-economic impact, recognition of the special rule of proof
in McGhee must now be recognized as one of the most important post-war common law decisions
in the United Kingdom.
54. See, for example, the blue bus debate and Charles Nesson's notion that when proof of
historical fact is appropriately based merely on statistics and when something more should he
required is linked to the acceptability of jury verdicts on the particular subject-matter. Charles
Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1357 (1985).
55. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983). Similar suggested re-
formulations include that the wrong itself is constituted by the exposure to this increased risk of
outcome rather than the outcome itself and the deprivation of an opportunity to pursue an alter-
native course of conduct. See generally DOBBS, supra note 53, at 434-41; David A. Fischer, Pro-
portional Liability: Statistical Evidence and the Probability Paradox, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1201
(1993); Nils Jansen, The Idea of a Lost Chance, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 271 (1999); John H.
King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Pre-existing Condi-
tions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests
and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247 (1992); Jane Stapleton, The
Gist of Negligence, Part IL- The Relationship between "Damage" and Causation, 104 LAW Q. REV.
389 (1988); Stapleton, supra note 28 (regarding "damage" to normal expectancies in failure to
rescue cases); Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause?: Further Rumina-
tions on Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1379 (2000). Note
that the "loss of a chance" formulation can apply both to question (a)-what if any were the
physical effects of the defendant's conduct?-and to question (b)-what would have happened in
the hypothetical world where the defendant did not commit the tortious conduct?
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b (CThe fact of causation is incapable
of mathematical proof, since no man can say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if
the defendant had acted otherwise. If, as a matter of ordinary experience, a particular act or
omission might be expected to produce a particular result. and if that result has in fact followed,
the conclusion may be justified that the causal relation exists. In drawing that conclusion, the
triers of fact are permitted to draw upon ordinary human experience as to the probabilities of the
case. Thus when a child is drowned in a swimming pool, no one can say with absolute certainty
that a lifeguard would have saved him; but the common experience of the community permits the
conclusion that the guard would more probably than not have done so, and hence that the ab-
sence of the guard has played a substantial part in bringing about the death of the child. Such
questions are normally for the jury, and the court may seldom rule on them as matters of law.").
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clear that a product did not give an adequate warning of some risk
involved with its use and yet there is evidentiary doubt whether,
had the warning been given, the victim would have read it, heeded
it, and thereby avoided the injury.
Again, the law has a choice as to the hurdle it places before
the plaintiff faced with this sort of evidentiary gap. One of the most
noteworthy examples of a pro-plaintiff rule in this area is the
heeding presumption adopted by many courts in relation to product
warnings. 57
The content of the hypothetical is dependent on what is iden-
tified as the tortious conduct-what it is that the plaintiff claims
the defendant ought to have done. A plaintiff may be unable to
show that she would have used a safety device if it had been sup-
plied by the defendant, but she may have sufficient evidence to
show that she would have done so had he supplied it and exhorted
her to wear it. In other words, she would lose if the allegation of
tortious conduct is merely the allegation of failure to supply the de-
vice, but she would win if the allegation were that of failure to sup-
ply it and to exhort its use. Put generally, in omission cases we
cannot answer the question of fact of historical relevance of tortious
conduct until we have chosen the norm of what the defendant was
legally obligated to do, if anything.58
For a clear discussion of many of the complexities relating to hypotheticals, see Robertson,
supra note 51, at 1768-73. For a classic study in the area, see Wex S. Malone, Runinations on
Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956). For my discussion of hypotheticals, see supra note 43.
57. See, e.g., Coffman v. Keane Corp., 628 A.2d 710 (N.J. 1993); Fischer, Failure to Warn
Cases, supra note 38, at 277-79; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§§ 2 cmt. i, 15 (1998) [hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY]; Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product
Warnings and Causation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 309 (1997). Note that this is not presumed
elsewhere such as in the case of medical warnings. Perhaps one explanation is the perception
that whereas product manufacturers are solely profit-oriented, those involved in the delivery of
medical services are also motivated by altruistic goals such as curing disease. For discussion of
profit as a relevant factor to the imposition of legal obligations, see infra notes 104, 110.
Canada has an interesting hybrid approach that reflects this distinction in a different way.
In product cases the plaintiff need only prove that she would have heeded the warning, whereas
in medical cases she must prove something more, namely that a reasonable person, albeit one
sharing the reasonable beliefs, fears, desires, and expectations of the patient, would not have
agreed to the medical procedure. Compare Hollis v. Birch, [1995] S.C.R. 634, with Arndt v.
Smith, [1997] S.C.R. 539. While the former rule is simply the orthodox rule concerning proof of
historical relevance, the latter has nothing to do with historical relevance and represents a trun-
cation of the scope of liability for consequences of tortious conduct.
Another area where the law might choose to assist plaintiffs is where they complain about
the failure of the defendant to control a third party because there may well be little evidence as
to whether, had the appropriate attempt at control been made, it would have succeeded in con-
trolling the third person. See infra note 58.
58. A distinction must be made between the defendant's conduct and the defendant's tor-
tious conduct. For example, the conduct of a child's parent and of another citizen in failing to
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B. Second Enquiry: Nature of the Role the Historic Factor Played in
the History of the Outcome and Relevance to Purpose of Project
Quite apart from the history enquiry, there is a wholly dif-
ferent type of question we can ask about a transition to an outcome.
We may have all the relevant past facts and know which factors
played a role in the history of the transition.59 But most of our en-
quiries have a purpose, and the question then arises as to the rela-
tive importance of these historically involved factors in terms of our
specific purpose and our views about how that purpose is best pro-
moted. For example, in the history of most terrestrial processes,
gravity plays a role. Yet it is rarely of purposive importance.
In contrast to science, sociology, and economics, the purpose
of the law of obligations is to allocate legal responsibility for certain
conduct and outcomes. How important a factor will be to that pur-
pose will depend upon our individual view about the appropriate
incidence, content and extent of legal responsibility in the context.
These normative choices arise in two types of cases.
feed the child appear physically identical. Each piece of conduct would satisfy the question, "did
the conduct play a role in the starvation injury of the child?" But this is a facile and banal route.
The law must first determine what the incidence of the obligation was (were both the parent and
citizen under a duty?) and what was the alleged tortious conduct-for example, the failure to act
as a reasonable parent-and then ask the focussed question of whether it played a role in the
history of the injury. In other words, the clearest analysis is one where the issue of what should
have been done by whom is addressed before the historical question so that the latter enquiry is
focussed only on the alleged wrongdoers. See DOBBS, supra note 53, at 410 n.7; Robertson, supra
note 51, at 1769-70; infra note 90. For an excellent discussion of the general area, see Wright,
Causation, supra note 3, at 1759-74 & n.104. Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) is con-
fused because it fails to elucidate this point.
Another way of putting this point is as follows: What is the comparator class against which
we view the role of the defendant's omission, reasonable parents or strangers? One's selection of
the appropriate comparator class is one way that subjectivity and normativity creep into the
setting in which we address the factual question of historical role. They also creep into the ap-
plication of the law to the evidence here because our personal experience, moral expectations,
and so on, can influence not only our choice of the appropriate comparator class, and our judg-
ment about the likely action of its members in the circumstances, but also our judgment of the
likely effectiveness of that conduct. See Stapleton, Perspectives on Causation, supra note 39, at
66-70. For example, in the case of the lifeguard who fails to try to rescue a drowning child, see
supra notes 28, 56, the comparator class that is likely to be selected is not that of the general
public but of lifeguards. But the historical relevance point vill also depend on judgments about
what such a hypothetical lifeguard would have tried to do and its likelihood of avoiding the in-
jury/death of the child. See RESTATFIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt b.
59. We may, for example, be certain what would have happened in our targeted but-for hy-
potheticals.
VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW
1. Whether it is Required that the Historic Factor also Played a
Necessary Role in the Transition to the Outcome: Over-
Determined Transitions °
The characteristic problem in cases of over-determination,
such as the double-hit hunters' case, does not involve a dispute
about the facts. Indeed, one does not arrive at the characteristic
problem in such cases unless it is established that both factors
played an historic role in the history of the relevant transition. In
other words, it must be established that the case is indeed one of
over-determination. For example, in the hunters' case, it must be
established that each gun discharged, that each shot a bullet that
hit the victim, that each wound would have been sufficient to kill,
and so on. Once those facts have been determined the characteristic
problem of such cases emerges: Before a consequence can fall within
the scope of liability, should the law choose to impose a requirement
that the defendant's tortious conduct must have been necessary for
that consequence?
For example, in the double hit hunters' case, the law could
choose to impose a requirement of necessity before the tortious con-
duct of a defendant-hunter could be held responsible for the out-
come. Since neither hunter satisfies the test of necessity-the tradi-
tional but-for test-neither would be held responsible under such a
requirement. Alternatively, the law might choose not to require
that the tortious conduct of each hunter played a necessary role in
the death before it could fall within the scope of liability for that
conduct. Courts and commentators often fail to recognize clearly the
choices the law may make here; they erroneously urge one view,
and only one view, as the natural or universal test.61 Yet the law
60. The challenge over-determined events pose for the legal system is normative. See supra
note 38 and sources cited. Therefore, to describe this challenge, as traditional analysis does, as
one going to "cause in fact' is dangerously misleading and generates sterile debates. See, e.g.,
Robertson, supra note 51, at 1766-67 & n.5, 1777-78. The law's responses to over-determinod
events are properly located within the evaluative Second Enquiry that, I argue in this Article,
should be designated the "scope of liability for consequences of tortious conduct" category. Supra
note 57.
61. Though the NESS approach of Hart, HonorS, and Wright correctly captures our under-
standing of historical involvement (such as our understanding of the double hit hunters' case),
this is obscured by their description of NESS as a test "of causation." For example, it is only if
we appreciate that Wright is addressing the issue of historical involvement (and not the norma-
tive choice in cases of over-determination) do certain of his statements hold. See, e.g., Wright,
Clarifying the Concepts, supra note 3, at 1020 ("[The choice among these senses of necessity and
sufficiency is not governed by policy considerations, but rather by how well each test corresponds
with our intuitive concept of causation."). For criticism of "causal" approaches to over-
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clearly chooses one approach in certain types of over-determination
cases and the other in the remainder.6 2 This is why the issue of
whether the law will choose to impose the conventional but-for
test-the requirement of necessity-to the facts of a case is a nor-
mative one and not relevant to the factual issue of whether the tor-
tious conduct played a role in the history of the consequence. It is
an area of law, therefore, that does not belong in the Cause-in-Fact
Chapter. It rightly belongs, along with other normative issues, in
the Chapter on the Scope of Liability for Consequences.
The typical response of the law is to choose to impose a re-
quirement of necessity, so that, unless the defendant's tortious con-
duct made the victim worse off, the injury to the victim falls outside
the appropriate scope of liability for consequences of that conduct.63
Of course, this might be rationalized in a number of ways, such as
deterrence or fairness to defendants.
But in a case such as the double hit hunters' case, 4 where
the simultaneous multiple sufficient historic factors are all pieces of
tortious conduct, this requirement of necessity would result in the
victim of two tortious acts being treated worse by the law than the
victim of a single tortious act (i.e., if he had only been shot at and
hit by one careless hunter). This is because, in the former case, the
plaintiff would be unable to establish that the death came within
the appropriate scope of liability of either tortfeasor, whereas, in
the latter case, he would be able to establish that it came within the
scope of liability of the lone tortfeasor. In such cases of simultane-
determination, see Fischer, Onission Cases, supra note 38, at 1356-60, 1384; Stapleton, Perspec-
tives on Causation, supra note 39, at 83 n.54, 84 n60; Stapleton, Unpacking "Causation," supra
note 39. It is not some mysterious "intuitive concept of causation" that underlies the law's re-
fusal to add necessity as a requirement in the certain over-determination cases (such as the
double-hit hunters' case) and to add that requirement in other over-determination cases. Rather,
it is our sense of how and why responsibility should be allocated in the case. This is something
that can and should be expounded.
62. This choice might be reflected in different formulations of actionable injury that might
be recognized. For example, if the law chooses to require that the defendant's tortious conduct
played a necessary role in the history of the consequence (othenrise that consequence lies outside
the scope of liability for consequences), actionable damage would be satisfied only by a loss if
that loss also represents "damage" to the normal expectancies of the victim viewed in the light of
all other factors present. Where the law does not require necessity, actionable "damage" might
be satisfied by a mere loss, that is, by a loss that might have happened anyway and so not be
"damage" to the victim's "normal expectancies." See Stapleton, Perspectives on Causation, supra
note 39, at 65-66, 82-84.
63. See, e.g., Rudeck v. Wright, 709 P.2d 621, 628 (Mont. 1985).
64. There is an interesting comparison to be made here with ordinary non-legal attributions
of responsibility. Consider how we might judge an individual soldier's responsibility in the con-




ous over-determination by multiple tortious acts, the law often
chooses not to impose the necessity requirement. This result can
and should be explicitly defended, on the basis that the legal con-
cern with upholding the "dignity of the law" outweighs concerns
with deterrence, fairness to defendants, and so on. Certainly, if the
hunters had fired at the victim intentionally and the criminal law
allowed them to escape, the law would be brought into public disre-
spect. A similar argument can be made in the private law area.
Cases of sequential over-determination by multiple pieces of
tortious conduct lie between these two extremes and, not unexpect-
edly, provoke varying responses from the law.
To sum up my point here, the factual issue of whether a fac-
tor played a role in the history of the consequence hinges only on
whether the factor was in some sense sufficient for that outcome, a
characteristic that will be revealed by application of the targeted
but-for test. But when it comes to the appropriate scope of liability
for consequences, the law has a choice of whether to impose a fur-
ther requirement, that the factor was necessary to the outcome.
This is a normative choice.
2. Disputes Concerning the Weight to be Placed on Historic Factors
Finally, for a range of moral, policy, and other reasons, a de-
fendant is never held liable for all consequences flowing from his
tortious conduct. A question arises, then, as to which consequences
should be regarded as within the scope of legal responsibility and
which outside it. There are cases in which the parties agree on the
past facts and that the defendant's tortious conduct played a role in
the history of a particular consequence, but they disagree on the
appropriate weight that the law should put on the defendant's tor-
tious conduct in the context of the particular cause of action.65
Sometimes the dispute is framed in terms of whether the "interven-
tion" of another historic factor leading to the consequence rendered
the defendant's tortious conduct unimportant for the purposes of
the cause of action. In other cases, the dispute is framed in terms of
the nature of the consequence of which complaint is made: Was it
"direct" or "remote"?; Was it (reasonably) foreseeable or not?; and so
on. In terms of doctrinal rhetoric, these two formulations are often
treated as distinct even though they are nothing more than differ-
65. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), is a classic example.
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ent ways of describing how a transition to a consequence of tortious
conduct proceeded.
Where an "intervention" description of the facts is plausible,
the defense argument is often framed in the pseudo-scientific lan-
guage of the "intervening factor" breaking the "chain of causation,"
so that the defendant's tortious conduct is not to be treated as a "le-
gal cause" even though it has played a role in the history of the
transition to the outcome. Such pseudo-scientific metaphors serve
only to mask the nature of the underlying dispute about competing
visions of the scope of liability (in terms of consequences) appropri-
ate to the particular cause of action. If the intervention breaks any-
thing, it breaks the chain of legal responsibility for consequences66
flowing from the tortious conduct. Similarly, in disputes presented
as concerning the nature of the consequence of which a complaint is
made, the vacuity of the mere assertion of an outcome being "too
remote" or "not proximate" is patent, especially in cases where the
effect is instantaneous and spatially very near.67
The range of legal concerns that have influenced whether the
scope of legal responsibility for tortious conduct extends to cover
the victim's injury is large and diverse. Like the concerns relevant
to duty, the concerns here may be general, such as the systemic
concern with indeterminate liability, or quite specific to the facts.
Also like those concerns affecting the duty issue, the concerns rele-
vant in any particular case depend on the perceived purpose of the
rule and tend to be buried deep in an opaque case law.
V. THE TREATMENT OF "LEGAL CAUSE" BY EARLIER
RESTATEMENTS
A. Legal Cause as an Amalgam: General Comments
Having set out, in non-causal language, the two different en-
quiries (concerning a transition) that are cloaked by the term "legal
cause," I now turn to the treatment of legal cause by earlier Re-
statements. Under Section 5 of the earlier Restatements, an actor
could not be subject to liability for another's injury unless the ac-
66. Of course, the chain of consequences flowing from the tortious conduct (that is, in rela-
tion to which the tortious conduct played a role in their history) is endless. See Michael S.
Moore, Causation and Responsibility, SOC. PHIL & PoLicy, Summer 1999, at 1; Michael S.
Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L RE%,. 827 (2000).
67. Such as in a modem day version of Palsgraf or of In re Polenxis, 3 K.B. 560 (Eng. CA
1921). See Stapleton, Perspectives on Causation, supra note 39, at 79.
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tor's conduct was a legal cause of that injury.68 Both Restatements
stated that legal cause was an amalgam: the actor's conduct is a
legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law which restricts liability because of the manner in which
the conduct operated to bring about the invasion of the other's interest.69
As the following subsections explain, whatever these two elements
of the amalgam were intended to mean, they clearly do not corre-
spond with the two separate enquiries we can make about a transi-
tion to a particular outcome that have just been discussed: the fac-
tual one, and the contextual/evaluative one. For example, at one
point,70 the Restatements suggest that only some factors that played
a role in the history of the outcome qualify as a substantial factor in
bringing it about, which demonstrates that evaluative notions are
68. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 5(a) (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 5 (1965). For
some torts, "legal cause" is also spelled out in a black-letter section as an element of the individ-
ual tort. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 37, 281, 430, 575 (false imprisonment, negligence,
slander resulting in special harm); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 37, 281, 430 (1965)
(false imprisonment, negligence); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 575, 632 (1977) (slander
resulting in special harm, injurious falsehood). For other torts, the legal cause requirement is
spelled out in a comment. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. d (1965);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 870 cmt. 1 (1977) (battery, liability for intended conso-
quences). But see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 13 (spelling out the requirement for battery in the
black-letter text of section).
As to the meaning of the term "legal cause," the Restatement (First) provided:
The words "legal cause" are used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to
denote the fact that the manner in which the actor's tortious conduct has re-
sulted in an invasion of some legally protected interest of another is such that
the law regards it just to hold the actor responsible for such harm.
Id. § 9.
This was modified in the next Restatement to read:
The words "legal cause" are used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to
denote the fact that the causal sequence by which the actor's tortious conduct
has resulted in an invasion of some legally protected interest of another is such
that the law holds the actor responsible for such harm unless there is some de-
fense to liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (1965) (emphasis added).
69. Both the earlier Restatements noted:
In order that a particular act or omission may be the legal cause of an invasion
of another's interest, the act or omission must be a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the harm and there must be no principle or rule of law which restricts
the actor's liability because of the manner in which the act or omission operates
to bring about such invasion.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 9 cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 cmt. b (1965).
This amalgam definition of legal cause is explicitly repeated in relation to the tort of negli-
gence in Section 431 of both Restatements. The Restatement (Second) extended this amalgam
definition of legal cause to other torts: "the rules stated in this Section are ... equally applicable
where the conduct is intended to cause harm, or where it is such as to result in strict liability."
Id. § 431 cmt. e.
70. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a.
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in play to effect this filtering. Moreover, even where a defendant's
tortious conduct qualifies as a substantial factor under the earlier
Restatements, the issue of whether the consequence is within the
appropriate scope of liability is not consistently acknowledged to be
a purely evaluative issue but is couched in the ambiguous language
of "causation."
In 1979, more than a decade after the legal cause chapter
appeared, the final volume of the Restatement (Second) was pub-
lished under the authorship of the new Reporter, Wade. In a Com-
ment on his Section 870,71 Wade attempted a realignment of these
elements by describing the earlier sections on substantial factor as
being about "cause-in-fact." But this awkward maneuver simply
introduced further anomalies within the Restatement (Second)
when read as a whole. To eliminate these anomalies, the Restate-
ment (Third) needs to restructure and rename the constituents of
legal cause in alignment with the two separate underlying enquir-
ies.
Another general criticism of earlier Restatements is their
disjointed treatment of this area of the law in relation to torts other
than negligence. This was one of the lamentable results of the Re-
statements' failure to incorporate adequately clear statements of
issues of general application to all torts. Thus, the extension to
other torts of the substantial factor sections, which are explicitly
discussed in relation to the tort of negligence, is effected in the Re-
statement (Second) merely by a comment to one section. 72 In rela-
tion to the second element of the amalgam, any "rule of law which
restricts liability because of the manner in which the conduct oper-
ated," there is no general section indicating the necessity of trunca-
tion of liability for consequences and the dependence of the scope of
liability for consequences on, inter alia, the perceived purpose of the
particular tort in issue. Thus, there is no clear signal at the outset
that, because the purpose of the tort of deceit is fundamentally dif-
ferent from that of the tort of mere negligence, the scope of liability
for consequences is likely to be different. Instead, the Restatement
(Second) contains only isolated sections dealing with some aspects
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. 1. (1979) (rFor liability to exist, the defen-
dant's conduct must have been the cause in fact of the harm to the plaintiff. The rules on cause
in fact for negligent conduct are applicable here in the case of intentional conduct.'); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-34 (1965). For treatment of legal cause for intentional
harm, see id. §§ 435A, 435B.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt e (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 870 cmt. 1 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 279-80 (1934).
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of the issue in relation to intentional torts73 and strict liability
torts.74
B. Substantial Factor75
Elaboration of the legal cause amalgam is set out in Chapter
16 of the Restatements. Chapter 16 of the Restatement (Second),
published in 1965 with Prosser serving as Reporter, contains no
reference to "factual cause,"76 "cause-in-fact, 77 or "actual cause."78
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435A, 435B (1965); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. 1 (1979).
74. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (1977) (explaining that the scope of
"strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnor-
mally dangerous").
75. For criticism of the differing meanings the Restatements give to "substantial factor," see
Robertson, supra note 51, at 1776. Both earlier Restatements also apparently use the term "sub-
stantial cause" as a synonym for "substantial factor," RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 430 cmt. a, 431
cmt. a, 434 cmt. c, 458 cmt. c, despite warnings to the contrary, see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS xv-
xvi (1934) (providing in the "Principles of Terminology Employed" that "[t]wo or more words
should not be used to express the same legal concept"). For discussion of the shifting history of
the notion of "substantial factor," see Wright, Causation, supra note 3, at 1781-84.
76. There is also no reference to "factual causation." The only reference to either term in
the Restatement (Second) is to "factual cause," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. j
(1979), in volume IV published after Dean John W. Wade had taken over reportorial responsibil-
ity.
77. There are only two references to "cause in fact" in the Restatement (Second),
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt, 1
(1979), both also published-in volumes III in 1977 and IV in 1979, respectively-after Wade had
taken over reportorial responsibility.
78. The only references to "actual cause" in the Restatement (Second) also occurred in Vol-
ume IV published after Dean John W. Wade had taken over reportorial responsibility,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 817 cmt. 1, 874A cmt. j (1979).
In the Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles (Discussion Draft), Professor
Schwartz states that " '[liegal cause' includes the doctrines of both actual cause and proximate
cause." Discussion Draft, supra note 14, § 3 cmt. a. This seems to suggest that he regards
"proximate cause" as the separate rules addressed after "actual cause" is found. By contrast, in
the Restatement (Second), the only mention of proximate cause treats it as synonymous with the
legal cause amalgam.
[One explanation for the last clear chance rule] is that the plaintiffs negligence
is not a "proximate" or legal cause of the harm to him, because the later negli-
gence of the defendant is a superseding cause which relieves the plaintiff of re-
sponsibility for it. This is quite out of line with modern ideas as to legal cause.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 cmt. a (1965).
There is, however, one reference to "proximate" harm in the Restatement (Second) that might
correspond to the Schwartz usage:
[Any harm which is in itself foreseeable, as to which the actor has created or
increased the recognizable risk, is always "proximate," no matter how it is
brought about, except where there is such intentionally tortious or criminal in-
tervention, and it is not within the scope of the risk created by the original
negligent conduct.
Id. § 442B cmt. b.
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There is, however, a single and telling reference to "actual causa-
tion" in Chapter 16 that is worth quoting at length. The Reporter's
Notes to Section 433 in the Restatement (Second) explained why the
issue of how extraordinary the harm appears was not a relevant
consideration in determining whether negligent conduct is a sub-
stantial factor in producing harm:
The "substantial factor" element [of the legal cause amalgam] deals with causation
in fact while the other element deals with a legal policy relieving the actor of li-
ability for harm he has, as a matter of fact, caused. The conclusion that it appears
highly extraordinary that the conduct should have brought about the harm has
nothing to do with the question whether it did actually "cause" the harm. The
question of actual causation involves an application of the laws of physics to the
data to determine whether there is an unbroken chain of causes and effects,
starting with the negligent conduct and ending with the harm complained of. Once
that question is answered "yes," the only remaining problem of actual causation is
the determination of whether the negligent conduct played a "substantial" part in
bringing about the harm. It seems obvious that the negligence may have been a
"substantial factor" in a particular case regardless of how "highly extraordinary"
the chain of events appears in retrospect. It is completely faulty analysis.., to list
the "extraordinary" element as a part of the "substantial factor "aspect of legal
cause .... It is confusing the question of policy with the question of fact. Any rule
of law which relieves an actor from liability for negligence because "it appears
highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm" is a rule of pol-
icy which relieves the actor from liability for harm he has, in fact, caused. This
conclusion is inevitable in the light of the Restatements analysis of "superseding
cause" as an intervening force which "prevents the actor from being liable for harm
to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing
about."7
This suggests that the Restatement intended the issue of
substantial factor to be approached as a question of pure historical
fact.80 But the Note to Section 433 is misleading in a number of
ways. For example, the reference to the laws of physics reflects a
long-standing fallacy in traditional running down cases that control
In Chapter 16 of the 1965 edition of the Restatement (Second), there is no mention of 'proxi -
mate causation," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-62 (1965), though there were a
number of references to "proximate cause" in earlier court decisions, RETATE.I.MENr (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433 app. (1966) (court citations to Restatement (First)).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 app., Reporter's Note (1966). This Note ex-
plained why the Restatement (Second) omitted from the list in Section 433 of "[c]onsiderations
i]mportant in [d]etermining [v]hether [n]egligent [c]onduct is (s]ubstantial [flactor in
[p]roducing [h]arm," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (1965), words from the Retoternent
(First), including- "whether after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negli-
gent conduct it appears highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 433(b).
80. Certainly, in later parts of the Restatement (Second), Wade, the new Reporter, described
the substantial factor issue as that of "causation in fact." See, e.g., RESTATFMEN " (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 546 (1977). Elsewhere, Wade described Prosser's Sections 431-34 as the "rules on cause
in fact for negligent conduct" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. l (1979). Yet Presser
had described Sections 432-33 as the rules which determine whether conduct is a substantial
factor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 465 cmt. b (1965).
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of liability for consequences can be achieved by some "billiard ball"
notion of the laws of physics. That is, this reference rests upon the
faulty notion that "claims for physical damage, whether to person
or property, are inherently limited by the laws of physics which
teach that physical forces will ultimately come to rest. ' 81 After I
have run you over and broken your leg, we have "come to rest" in a
crude sense. Yet if you later suffer negligent treatment at a hospital
that damages your other leg, the law may well say this injury is
within the appropriate scope of my liability for consequences. What
is doing the work in this judgment is not some inherent limit on my
liability set by the law of physics but a judgment about the appro-
priate scope of liability for consequences in light of, among other
things, the perceived purpose underlying the recognition of the ob-
ligation in the first place.
A second problem with the Note to Section 433 is that if, as
it suggests, we adopt a factual construction of the issue of substan-
tial factor, this will not fit in with a critical comment to Section
431:
Comment a. Distinction between substantial cause and cause in the philosophic
sense .... The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the defendant's
conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to re-
gard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always
lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense,"
which includes every one of the great number of events without which any hap-
pening would not have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the so-called
"philosophic sense," yet the effect of many of them is so insignificant that no ordi-
nary mind would think of them as causes. 82
81. This odd idea that how physical damage may come about is somehow limited by velocity
is also evident in the Restatement (Second) in the notion of conduct that has created a force that
is "in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 433(b) (1965); see also id. § 439; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
§ 105 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 2, May 10, 2000) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft No. 2]
C(Most personal injuries and property damages are caused by physical forces that are inherently
limited by the laws of physics. A speeding automobile will eventually come to rest ... ."); id. cmt.
e CMost claims for physical damage, whether to person or property, are inherently limited by the
laws of physics which teach that physical forces will ultimately come to rest."). Compare id. § 2A
cmt. b C'Theoretically it is possible to trace the consequences of conduct indefinitely for the flow
of future events is forever altered by each person's conduct."), with id. § 105 cmt. b (Tho factual
connection between conduct and harm may be unlimited- .. "). Dobbs provides a useful discus-
sion of why unpredictable ricochet effects may be included within the scope of liability for conse-
quences. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 467-68.
82. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431
cmt. a (1965). Remarkably, this crucial comment is ignored by Keeton, who asserts that the
"1948 revision of the Restatement limited [the] application [of "substantial factor'] very definitely




Both Restatements then list 3 among the considerations that
are important in determining whether the actor's conduct is a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about harm: (a) the number of other fac-
tors that contribute to producing the harm and the extent of the
effect that they have in producing it; (b) whether the actor's conduct
has created a force or series of forces that are in continuous and
active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situa-
tion harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor
is not responsible; and (c) lapse of time. While it may well be true
that these considerations affect the way we use causal language, at
least in a context of the attribution of responsibility, none is rele-
vant to the scientific issue of whether a factor played a role in the
history leading to the harm, which is the only real question of fact
here. Moreover, at its most curious, science does not rank historical
factors in terms of "significance," for there are no criteria on which
to do so without the purpose of the project first being set. It is the
lawyer's purpose in allocating legal responsibility that is driving
this notion of significance, just as it is what drives other glosses put
on the word "substantial" by the Restatements: that the factor must
have "an appreciable effect," even if another has a "predominant
effect," and must not be "so attenuated as to be insignificant and
unsubstantial as compared to the aggregate of the other factors
which have contributed."84
The nub of the problem reflected in Comment a to Section
431 is the superficial attraction of, and long-standing reliance on,
causal usage, not merely as a shorthand for, but as a criterion by
which to determine one of the pre-conditions of legal responsibility.
The earlier Restatements are flawed by their incoherent insistence
that the issue of substantial factor is a question of physics and yet
also dependent on the usage of causal language, "in which there
always lurks the idea of responsibility." While so ever we continue
to rely on causal usage in disputes couched as disputes about cau-
sation, causation in law will continue to be a black-box "concept"
that encourages obfuscatory arguments by counsel and impenetra-
ble decisions by courts and juries alike.
The inadequacy of causal usage as a guide to attribution of
responsibility in legal disputes is worth emphasizing. Of course, it
is true that there are areas where causal usage is uniform. At least
83. iAESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 433.




in the context of the attribution of moral or legal responsibility,85 no
one would say that the decision of the great-great-grandmother of
Lee Harvey Oswald to have children was a cause of the death of
President Kennedy. Conversely, if I intentionally run you over with
my car and your leg is broken, no one would say I was not the cause
of that injury. The problem is that this uniformity of the way we
use causal terms in these cases is based on our agreement about the
underlying responsibility issue that is left un-enunciated. Yet un-
less we try to unpack the responsibility ideas in play behind causal
language, and separate them from the question of historical fact, we
cannot hope to clarify the law in this area. This is best illustrated
by the many cases where courts face legal disputes presented as
disputes "about causation" even where the facts are agreed. Here
the framing of the disputes is testament to the lack of a consensus
about how causal language should be used in each case. The parties
disagree about causal usage, not because they disagree about the
facts, but because they disagree about the underlying responsibility
issue. So the fact that we can detect crude patterns of agreed causal
usage in other situations such as that of Mrs. Oswald does not help
the resolution of their dispute.
Prosser seems to have been aware of this incoherence in the
treatment of substantial factor in the Restatements. In two places,
he notes that particular features of a consequence, such as its
freakishness 8 6 or its occurrence after the intervention of another
85. See supra note 15; infra notes 88, 90, 112. Though in other contexts we may well use
causal language to describe the link between the reproductive decisions of ancestors and the
crimes of their descendents. For example, when two academics released their research showing
a correlation between the increased use of abortion following the liberalization of its availability
in Roe v. Wade and the recent reduction in the United States crime rate, the press reported that
the goal of the researchers had been to "shed light on the causes of crime." Amy Goldstein, The.
ory Ties Abortion to Crime Drop, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1999, at A9. Their conclusion was that
legalizing abortion in the 1970s may be a leading cause of plummeting crime rates in the 1990s.
Id. Causal usage depends on our purpose in the context. See generally Stapleton, Unpacking
"Causation," supra note 39.
86. Prosser inserted in the Second Restatment:
Analytically, the highly extraordinary nature of the result which has followed
from the actor's conduct (with or without the aid of an intervening force) indi.
cates that the hazard which brought about or assisted in bringing about that
result was not among the hazards with respect to which the conduct was negli-
gent. (See §§ 451 and 468.) Strictly, the problem before the court is one of de-
termining whether the duty imposed on the actor was designed to protect the
one harmed from the risk of harm from the hazard in question. (See § 281
Comment e, and § 449.) However, courts frequently treat such problems as
problems of causation. (See § 281, Comment e, and § 430, Comment a.).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435 cmt. c; see also supra note 79 (citing the Appendix to
court citations).
Prosser also noted in the Restatement (Second):
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relevant factor,8 7 raise the normative issue of the appropriate scope
of liability for consequences and not the issue of substantial factor.
Yet these are the very sort of features that may well influence the
"popular sense" of how to use the term "cause,"83 which elsewhere in
the Restatement we are told governs the requirement of being a
"substantial" factor. Prosser unsatisfactorily glosses over the prob-
lem by simply noting that courts often deal with these features in
the language of causation and that treatment of these features
would be "facilitated by an appreciation of the fact that the problem
is a 'hazard problem' rather than a problem of causation."89
This strongly suggests that the Restatement (Third) should
abandon the "substantial" gloss on the notion of causation and ex-
In the 1948 Supplement to the first Restatement, this Section was changed by
the addition of Subsection (2), and corresponding revision of the Comments.
The Reporter's Note explained briefly that "as pointed out in the reason stated
in s 433, accuracy of analysis in the light of the modern emphasis on the hazard
problem requires the change."...
The question of the effect of the unforeseeability of the impact or harm itself
is inextricably interwoven with that of duty to the plaintiff. See § 281(b), and
Comments and the Note to that Section. Where the issue of duty has been dis-
regarded, it is usually held that the unforeseeability of the harm itself does not
prevent liability for it ... In other cases the unforeseeability of the harm itself
has been stated as a reason for denying liability. In these cases it is often im-
possible to determine whether the court is proceeding on the basis of the ab-
sence of any duty to the plaintiff (see § 281(b)), or on the basis of the highly ex-
traordinary nature of the result, as stated in Subsection (2) of this Section, or is
rejecting the rule stated in Subsection (1).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 app., Reporter's Note (1966).
87. The Restatement (Second) discusses "[r]elation to legal cause" in a comment to Section
281:
The problem which is involved in determining whether a particular intervening
force is or is not a superseding cause of the harm is in reality a problem of de-
termining whether the intervention of the force was within the scope of the rea-
sons imposing the duty upon the actor to refrain from negligent conduct. If the
duty is designed, in part at least, to protect the other from the hazard of being
harmed by the intervening force, or by the effect of the intervening force oper-
ating on the condition created by the negligent conduct, then that hazard is
within the duty, and the intervening force is not a superseding cause . . . . A
completely accurate analysis of the hazard element in negligence would require
the material on superseding cause in Chapter 16 to be placed in this chapter
[on Negligence: General Principles]. However, in the past the courts generally
have discussed the effect of intervening forces in terms of causation. The solu-
tion of the problem of determining whether the presence of an intervening force
should relieve the actor from liability for harm which his conduct was a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about ... is facilitated by an appreciation of the fact
that the problem is a "hazard problem" rather than a problem of causation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. h (1965).
88. For example, these are the sort of reasons why few would, in the context of allocation of
personal responsibility, say Mrs. Oswald was a cause or a substantial factor in President Ken-
nedy's death. See supra notes 15, 85 and accompanying text; infra notes 90, 112. These insights
emerged from the classic study in HART & HONOR9, supra note 3, at 1=m-viii.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt h. For the full text of this comment, see
supra note 87.
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plicitly restrict the notion of causation in law to the purely factual
question of whether the defendant's tortious conduct played a role
in the history leading to the plaintiffs injury. Juries should be in-
structed to approach causation in law in this historical, scientific
sense even though it may differ from ordinary usage of causal lan-
guage.90 Then within this "cause-in-fact" chapter, the Restatement
(Third) should set out the special rules of proof in relation to evi-
dentiary gaps relating to cause-in-fact, such as the Summers v. Tice
rule and the heeding presumption. In a completely separate chap-
ter, entitled "Scope of Liability for Consequences of Tortious Con-
duct," the Restatement should then collect the issues concerning
this entirely normative question of the appropriate scope of liabil-
ity. These include rules relating to over-determined outcomes. The
misleading and indeterminate terms, "legal cause," "proximate
cause," and "substantial factor" should be abandoned.
C. Over-Determination
Another way normativity infects the notion of "substantial
factor" in the earlier Restatements is that it is defined to accommo-
date both of the contrasting responses the law may take when con-
fronted with over-determination. Section 432 provides:
NEGLIGENT CONDUCT AS NECESSARY ANTECEDENT OF HARM
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is not a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been sus-
tained even if the actor had not been negligent.
90. Juries should do so just as a scientist in the context of measurement uses certain terms
in a single precise factual meaning (e.g., "yard," "foot," or "stone"). Many of the incongruities
that this non-ordinary usage might seem to threaten are avoided if the law addresses the issue of
historical fact only in relation to a factor already formulated as the alleged tortious conduct,
rather than merely the defendants conduct. See supra note 58. For example, no one would, in
the context of the allocation of any type of personal responsibility, say Mrs. Oswald was a "cause"
of the death of Kennedy even though her reproductive decision was an historical factor. See
supra notes 15, 85, 88; infra note 112. But my proposal that "cause-in-fact' in law should be
equated with any factor that played an historic role in the history of the relevant consequence
would never force a jury to abandon their "ordinary sense" usage and say Mrs. Oswald was a
"cause" because the law should require the plaintiff first to formulate what it was about Mrs.
Oswald's conduct that was the alleged tortious conduct. Only once this had been done would the
jury be asked to determine if that aspect of her conduct was an historical factor and therefore a
"cause-in-factf' in law of the death. But in cases such as Mrs. Oswald, the reason there is such a
consensus about causal usage, i.e., the reason no one would say she was a cause of Kennedy's
death in a context of the attribution of individual responsibility, is that it is agreed that her
conduct in no arguable way contravened any type of responsibility rule. In such cases, the plain-
tiff never gets to the "cause-in-face' point.
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(2) If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the
other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to
bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substan-
tial factor in bringing it about.9 '
That the law has a normative choice whether to impose a require-
ment that the defendant's tortious conduct was necessary to the
history of the outcome is not spelled out clearly, nor are the legal
concerns that govern where the law chooses to impose this require-
ment and where it does not. In the Restatement (Third), these is-
sues should be distinguished from the factual issue of whether the
factor played any role in the history of the consequence. That is,
they should be distinguished from the cause-in-fact enquiry, and
they should be located within a Chapter dealing with the other
normative issues raised by the question of: "For which conse-
quences of tortious conduct should a defendant be liable?"
D. The Second Half of the Amalgam
Earlier I noted that both of the earlier Restatements stated
that legal cause was an amalgam of two requirements: that the ac-
tor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
that "there is no rule of law which restricts liability because of the
manner in which the conduct operated to bring about the invasion
of the other's interest." While Sections 432-33 dealt with the issue
of substantial factor, Sections 435-61 dealt with this second half of
the amalgam and included discussions of freakish results, foresee-
ability, and intervening factors.
It is significant that the Reporters of the earlier Restate-
ments couched the second limb of the amalgam in these terms, for it
suggests that prima facie all consequences of the tortious conduct
are within the scope of the obligation unless some special rule of
law can be found to truncate responsibility. Indeed, in both Re-
statements, Sections 435-61 are referred to as "rules restricting re-
sponsibility" 92 that operate only "occasionally"9 3 and the Introduc-
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432. The corresponding provision in the Restate-
ment (First) ends, "the actor's negligence may be held by the jury to be a substantial factor in
bringing it about." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 432 (1934). For an example of the use of"substan-
tial factor" as a device to evade the normative issue presented by over-determined events, see
generally Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465 cmt. b; RESTATE.MiENT OFTORTS § 465 cmt. a.
93. "[S]uch rules as occasionally relieve a negligent actor from responsibility for harm which
his negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about because of the particular manner in
which his negligence produces the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 16, Scope Note;
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 16, Scope Note.
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tory Note to these sections states: "Only a few of the [s]ections in
this Topic state rules which restrict liability short of holding the
actor [liable] for all the harm of which his negligence is a substan-
tial cause."94 This pro-jury dynamic is evident elsewhere in the legal
cause chapter (Chapter 16). Because of the challenge presented by
non-traditional claims, especially in the tort of negligence, the Re-
statement (Third) should recast the separate, non-historical issue of
the scope of liability for consequences in a more even-handed way.
Professor Perlman's phrase that such restrictions on the "scope of
legal obligations"95 only occur "in unusual circumstancess" 96 is,
therefore, to be regretted.
The Restatement (Third) should acknowledge that liability
for consequences of tortious conduct always has a limit and that the
position of the limit for a particular tort is generated by a consid-
eration of many specific legal concerns. 97 On occasion, consideration
of these legal concerns, including the perceived purpose of the rele-
vant tort, will be judged to warrant the crystallization of a rule of
law governing the scope of liability for consequences. One example
of such a rule in the tort of negligence is that foreseeability (of the
kindltype/nature of the harm suffered) is a necessary requirement
for the scope of liability for consequences. 98 This is, of course, a no-
toriously malleable "rule" that will rarely provide control because it
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 16, tit. B, Introductory Note; RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS ch. 16, tit. B., Introductory Note.
95. By using this phrase, Professor Perlman seems to mean restrictions of law under both
the old incidence of obligation categories (such as the duty concept in the tort of negligence) and
any restrictions of law in relation to the defendant's liability for consequences of his tortious
conduct. See infra Part VI.
96. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 81, § 105; see also id. § 105 cmt. a (stating "in lim.
ited circumstances").
97. Some of which will, on the facts, weigh in favor of a wider scope of liability for conse-
quences and some of which will, on the facts, weigh in favor of a narrower scope of liability for
consequences.
98. This is the approach with which "American cases are overwhelmingly consistent... al-
though their manner of expression is often slightly different." DOBBS, supra note 53, at 455. The
most commonly cited authorities for this foreseeability rule are Judge Cardozo's approach in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)-even though, as Dobbs explains,
DOBBS, supra note 53, at 455-56, Cardozo did not couch his approach in terms of legal/proximate
cause-and the Privy Council decision in Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engtg
Co., [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) ("Wagon Mound I").
The amplification or gloss on the rule that all that needs to be foreseeable is the
kind/type/nature of the harm suffered is generally regarded as a necessary implication of the
basic rule. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 460 n.15, 466 n.1, 468 n.7. Contra In re Kinsman Transit
Co., 338 F.2d 708, 726 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.). In the United Kingdom, the first enunciation
of and prime authority for this gloss came soon after Wagon Mound I in Hughes v, Lord Advo-
cate, [1963] AC. 837 (H.L.). See MICHAEL A. JONES, TEXTBOOK ON TORTS 206-07 (5th ed. 1996);
see also JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 239 (9th ed. 1998).
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crucially depends on how broadly or narrowly the kind/type/nature
of the harm is described. Until its modern erosion, a more "bright-
line" rule of law governing the scope of liability for consequences in
the tort of negligence was the one limiting liability for consequences
following the criminal interventions of third parties.
But rules of law governing the scope of liability for conse-
quences are rare in any particular tort. In most situations, the law's
concerns are simply factors that the law regards as appropriate for
the decision-maker to have in mind when exercising the discretion
inherent in applying legal rules to a specific set of facts. The Re-
statement (Third) should, of course, record the rare rules of law
governing the scope of liability for consequences for any particular
tort, but it should also record those relevant legal concerns that
arise out of the particular facts of the case, so that they can be in-
cluded in counsels' argument before, and trial judge's instructions
to, the jury.
As Prosser noted, though courts may have often dealt with
issues of the freakishness/foreseeability of the outcome or the rele-
vance of an intervening factor in causal language,9 neither issue
arises as a dispute about the facts, but as a dispute about the issue
of responsibility arising from agreed facts.100 Though Prosser was
content to retain the title of "cause" in this field, both in "legal
cause" and "proximate cause," clarity of this area of law concerning
the issue of which consequences of tortious conduct are appropri-
ately within the scope of liability will not improve until the entire
terminology of cause is "unpacked" and removed. Until then, the
temptation will be too great for counsel and trial judges to mask the
complex issues in play behind mere assertions that causal language
can adequately guide juries and/or justify legal determinations. As
noted earlier, my suggestion for a title for this area of the law and
its chapter in the Restatement (Third) is the "Scope of Liability for
Consequences of Tortious Conduct."
VI. PROFESSOR PERLMAN'S DRAFT NOMENCLATURE
Professor Perlman has suggested that the phrase "scope of
legal obligation" should be used to refer to those areas "in which
courts have imposed limits on the legal obligation of an actor as a
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281 cmt. h, 435 cmt. c (1965); RESTATFMWFT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 app. (1966); see supra notes 86-87.
100. Dobbs neatly expresses this as "about the legal significance of causation, rather than the
existence of causation." DOBBS, supra note 53, at 409.
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matter of law,"'101 legal rules such as those relating to the incidence
of the obligation. I think that this approach is unhelpful for two
reasons. First, it adopts the idea that limits on the incidence of le-
gal obligation will be exceptional, going merely to the scope of an
existing general obligation rather than reflecting the powerful mes-
sage of freedom from obligation that no-obligation findings (such as
no-duty findings in the tort of negligence) can usefully provide in an
era of ever-more ambitious non-traditional claims in tort.
Secondly, Professor Perlman contrasts the phrase "scope of
legal obligation" with the phrase "scope of liability (proximate
cause)," the former referring to the rules of law bounding the inci-
dence and content of obligation, and the latter referring to the ap-
plication of these rules to the facts by the jury. I agree that it is im-
portant for the Restatement (Third) to differentiate between legal
rules and those legal concerns raised by the facts that should
merely be brought to the attention of the jury. But I think it would
be preferable if this were accomplished within broadly familiar doc-
trinal categories.
Moreover, the new arrangement suggested by Professor
Perlman seems to strip out too much from the role of the judge. For
example, he states that his draft Section 105 "also avoids use of
'foreseeability' as an element that defines the scope of an actor's
duty" to be decided by the judge, since the issue of "whether the ac-
cident was foreseeable is more properly a jury decision." 102 Yet, at
least in the tort of negligence, foreseeability is inherent in the de-
scription of the legal obligation because the notion of reasonable
care can only operate against the notion of some perception of fore-
seeable risk, howsoever generally conceived. One cannot conduct
oneself unreasonably if there is no reasonably foreseeable risk in-
volved. Now it is, of course, a matter for the jury in any individual
negligence case to decide the foreseeability issue after evidence of
the facts has been given. But it is not possible for the trial judge to
describe the incidence of the legal obligation we call the tort of neg-
ligence without mention of foreseeability of risk at its most general.
Perlman's suggested nomenclature raises graver questions.
For example, it is not clear to which of his suggested areas--"scope
of legal obligation" or "scope of liability (proximate cause)"-Profes-
sor Perlman would allocate the idea that foreseeability (of the
101. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 81, § 105 cmt. c.; see also id. §§ 2A cmts. d, o, 105,
Reporter's Note.
102. Memorandum from Harvey Perlman to Advisers and Members Consultative Group 4
(May 3, 2000), in Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 81.
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kind/type/nature of the harm suffered) is a necessary requirement
for the scope of liability for consequences in the tort of negligence.103
If courts are justified in keeping a negligence case from the jury
because there is no evidence that the particular consequence was
anything but completely freakish and "unforeseeable," even in
hindsight, this sounds like a rule of law that Professor Perlman
would allocate to the "scope of legal obligation"' area. But by doing
so he will lump together legal concerns (those bearing on the ap-
propriate incidence of duty lumped together with those bearing on
the scope of liability for consequences of tortious conduct) that are
usefully distinguished, and have been, in the past, the subject of
separate doctrinal categories.
In my view, it is best to regard the incidence of obligation
question separately from the consequences question. Under the
former, the law can explicitly weigh and expound general systemic
issues, going to the question of whether an obligation should be
owed at all, that are apparent at the time the defendant acted and
that are not dependent upon how his conduct happened to turn out
on a specific occasion. An example here is whether a commercial
host owes a duty to conduct himself as a reasonable person in his
position would, including in relation to controlling his patrons.34
Where legal concerns in favor of the recognition of an obligation
outweigh others, a "pocket" or "island" of obligation emerges. This
analytical arrangement allows the law to recognize and signal areas
of freedom as well as pockets of obligation. For example, it enables
the law of negligence to give an appropriate advance-warning signal
to alert actors about the occasions when they are vulnerable to li-
ability if they fail to conduct themselves as a reasonable person
would. This also allows the law to separate out the signal it gives as
to what a person under such an obligation should have done in a
specific factual context to satisfy the obligation. Failure to behave
in this manner is tortious conduct.
It further allows the law to separate out the question of
those consequences of tortious conduct for which the defendant will
be held liable and those for which he will not. An example of this
question is whether the commercial host under a duty of care is li-
able when he fails to act as a reasonable person in his position
would have, and thereby fails to control a drunk patron who then
103. See supra note 98 and accompanying text
104. One example is the general view that, whereas a commercial host owes an obligation of
care to the victim of a person to whom he serves alcohol, a social host does not. Preliminary Draft
No. 2, supra note 81, § 105 cmt. b.
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injures the plaintiff, but in a freakish way. This "scope of liability
for consequences" question is one to which a different set of con-
cerns may be judged relevant than those that determined the inci-
dence of the relevant "pocket" of obligation. It is important to sepa-
rate these analyses and the signals that the conclusions to these
separate questions send out to society. Perlman's suggestion of
lumping together those elements of the two areas-of incidence of
obligation and scope of liability for consequences-that happen to
be accepted at the moment as issues for the judge, 105 destroys the
distinct signals and therefore the value of traditional doctrinal
categories. This is a very high price to pay to retain the notion of a
"general legal obligation of reasonable care" within the tort of neg-
ligence. In my view, we would gain much by keeping the incidence
of obligation question separate from the consequences issue, and by
detailing not only the very few ideas that have crystallized into
rules of law but also those legal concerns the decision-maker may
regard as relevant to its judgment in applying the rules of law to
the facts.
VII. THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES OF
TORTIOUS CONDUCT: GENERAL ASPECTS
One important point that the Restatement (Third) must
make clear is that damage is not the gist of every tort. However,
where damage does form the gist of the action, an historical rela-
tion between tortious conduct and the damage must be shown. The
law's concern that a defendant not be held liable for the infinite
stream of consequences flowing from tortious conduct requires the
limitation of every obligation to a finite set of consequences. 00
105. Id. §§ 2A cmts. d, e, 105 cmt. c, Reporter's Note.
106. Some argue that general strict liability is impossible and incapable of generating doter-
minate results. See Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CANADIAN
J. LAW & JURIS. 147 (1988); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CMI.-
KENT L. REV. 407, 419 (1987) CThe need for artificial limitation confirms that strict liability is
not theoretically viable."). This is not one that distinguishes strict from fault-based liability.
General fault-based liability is also "impossible." It is true that its incidence would be narrower,
for only those plausibly "at faut' would be caught by it. Yet, as we are seeing with the explosion
of non-traditional claims, the negligence idea is particularly voracious and can plausibly ground
a vast range of allegations. See supra notes 10, 11 and accompanying text. More importantly,
however, without restraining doctrines the scope of the defendant's liability for the consequences
of tortious conduct under a general fault-based liability would be infinite.
In fact, what makes negligence possible and workable in the real world is exactly the doc-
trinal features that make strict liability possible and workable: a combination of incidonce-
limiting rules (producing the episodic recognition of the duty of care we see in the tort of negli-
984 [Vol. 54:3:941
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Every obligation will be attended by legal concerns that influence
the scope of liability for the consequences of tortious conduct. The
perceived purpose of the cause of action will affect the range of such
legal concerns and the weight accorded to each (e.g., the fact that
the plaintiff is a public figure will be relevant in one tort, such as
defamation, but will be of little or any relevance in another, such as
trespass). The Restatement (Third) should make all these points in
a general Section, that applies to all torts, dealing with the notion
of the scope of liability for consequences of tortious conduct.
These legal concerns, like those relevant to the incidence of
obligation,10 7 may cover a wide range including: (1) the perceived
purpose of the recognition of a pocket of obligation in the circum-
stances; (2) the costs of legal rules and their administration; (3) the
dignity of the law; (4) the interest in individual freedom; (5) the
recklessness or intention to harm, if any, of the defendant;103 (6) the
relative wrongfulness of different actors; (7) the concern that the
extent of liability not be wholly out of proportion to the degree of
wrongfulness;10 9 (8) the fact that the defendant was acting in pur-
suit of commercial profit;" 0 (9) whether allowance of recovery for
gence; and the isolated occasions on which the common law recognizes strict obligations) and
rules limiting the scope of liability for consequences of tortious conduct.
Just as it is an essential project to decipher and assess the various legal concerns that, in
tension with one another go to produce the incidence-limiting rules such as the duty rules of
negligence, it is an essential project to do the same for the legal concerns relevant to the "scope of
liability for consequences" issue. Additionally, just as both "unpacking projects are necessary to
reveal the richness of the ideas underlying our fault-based liabilities, so they are necessary to
show the complexity and resonances of those underlying our strict liabilities.
107. For many examples of factors relevant to the recognition of (the incidence of) the obliga-
tion in the tort of negligence (ie., the recognition of a duty of care) from the United Kingdom and
Commonwealth case law, see Stapleton, Judicial Menus, supra note 10. Where courts or com-
mentators cite a legal concern of purported relevance to the duty issue or to the "scope of liability
for consequences" issue, these must, of course, then be subjected to critical evaluation. For ex-
ample, the modern hostility to Winterbottorn v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), reflects a
judgment that the particular legal concern cited in the rationale of the no-duty result (freedom of
and privity of contract) was flawed and illegitimate in the context of the case. Similarly, the
assertion that the insurance status and/or insurability of plaintiff or defendant should be rele-
vant to the duty issue or to the scope of liability for consequences issue is, in my view, illegiti-
mate and merely masks an unstated ideological preference. Jane Stapleton, Tort, Insurance and
Ideology, 58 MOD. L REV. 820 (1995).
108. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435A & cmt. a, 501(2) (1965); id. 435B
cmt. a ('[R]esponsibility for harmful consequences should be carried further in the case of one
who does an intentionally wrongful act than in the case of one who is merely negligent or is not
at fault."); infra notes 148, 154, and text accompanying note 170.
109. Just's Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho 1978); Coffey v. City of
Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 140 (Vis. 1976); Ryan v. New York Central Ry. Co., 35 N.Y. 210
(1886); Gary T. Schwartz, Causation Under US Law, in UNIFICATION OF TORT L ,W: CAUSATION
123-26 (J. Spier ed., 2000).
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such consequences would be likely to open the way to fraudulent
claims;"' and so on. Some of these legal concerns may be quite spe-
cific to the unusual facts of a case, and others may be quite com-
monly raised by the facts of cases.
Describing all such concerns as "policy" is awkward and un-
necessarily constricting. Imagine that the victim of a negligent
driver is en route to the hospital in an ambulance when it is struck
by lightning and the victim is killed. Describing all legal concerns
relevant to the issue of the appropriate scope of the driver's liability
for consequences as instrumentalist "policy" requires us to say that,
though the negligent driver played a role in the history leading to
the death, the reason the tort of negligence does not hold her liable
for the death is a mere matter of policy. It would similarly require
us to say the reasons Mrs. Oswald was not liable for Kennedy's
death and the reasons the stranger is not liable for the death of the
drowned infant-stranger were mere matters of "policy." Yet this
does not seem to capture convincingly the core impulses (or at least
all the impulses) underlying the legal judgment in these cases. u 2 A
110. The fact that the defendant was acting in pursuit of profit has been cited by common
law courts as one theme affecting the determination of duty. See supra notes 57, 104 (United
States); Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1186 (Supreme Court of
Canada); Jane Stapleton, Peripheral Parties, supra note 24, at 341 n.143 (citing from the United
Kingdom); Jane Stapleton, Judicial Menus, supra note 10, at 79-82 (same). It is quite feasible
and appropriate that juries might also regard it as relevant to the determination of the scope of
liability for consequences.
111. Coffey, 247 N.W.2d at 132; Kendall W. Harrison, Wisconsin's Approach to Proximate
Cause, WIS. LAW., Feb. 2000, at 20.
112. Some sort of rights language would seem to be at least as, if not more, convincing hero.
See supra notes 15, 17, 85. As these examples show: Rights-reasoning is not necessarily pro-
plaintiff in orientation, just as instrumentalist "policy" reasons can cut both ways. Sometimes,
however, rights language can be misleading as a generator of legal entitlements (as opposed to a
way of expressing them). For example, most people would agree that a drowning child has, in a
sense, a "right to life." Yet the stranger has no legal duty to rescue him, indeed we might well
say that, in law, he has a "right' not to try. Whatever is involved in the social and moral notion
of the child's "right to life," it is no trump in the tort of negligence which refuses to recognize that
it grounds a legal entitlement to have the stranger attempt a rescue.
Of course, many legal concerns can be formulated either in instrumentalist or rights-based
terms. Say an individual is legally allowed to carry on in some way (e.g., to choose not to rescue a
drowning stranger-infant, or to choose an uneconomic crop for his land or to leave it fallow for a
decade) that is not economically the most efficient use of resources judged from a wealth maximi
zation point of view. From one perspective it may seem that a collective goal has been defeated
by the individual's "right' so to act. But from another collective perspective this goal may seem
merely short-term, and in conflict with the overall collective goal because it is judged that society
works best long-term if people believe they have, and do indeed possess, individual rights against
the collective. Hence, the recognition of rights is utilitarian. The converse argument can also be
made. For the argument that "there are both economic and non-economic ways of understanding
deterrence," see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802, 1828-33 (1997).
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more satisfying exposition is one that embraces all legal concerns
relevant to the scope of liability for consequences, including those
that are couched in non-instrumental language. So, just as with the
incidence of obligation issue, we will find that the legal concerns
relevant in the "cause in fact" and "scope of liability for conse-
quences" areas will sometimes be best expressed in instrumental
terms and sometimes in rights language. It would be an advance if
the Restatement (Third) did not describe this rich range of legal
concerns by the term "policy."
Identifying the legal concerns that have influenced past
judgments relevant to the scope of liability for consequences will be
even more difficult than the equivalent project to identify the legal
concerns generating the incidence of the obligation. At least in the
existing case law on the incidence of the obligation, the court should
have attempted a reasoned justification for its decision (though
many recent no-duty cases in the tort of negligence suffer from a
lamentably thin attempt in this regard). In relation to the scope of
liability for consequences, there are very few crystallized rules of
law, for the good reason that this preserves essential flexibility and
discretion in the system (as Commonwealth courts recognized when
jury trials were abandoned in negligence claims in those jurisdic-
tions)." 3 What this means is that, in the majority of cases, the most
that the project of'identifying the legitimate legal concerns relevant
to the scope of liability for consequences will facilitate is more
meaningful and comprehensible argument before the jury, and
more precise jury instructions. There is potential thereby to influ-
ence the jury in its application of the law to the facts.
Of course, it has always been possible for such legal concerns
to have been identified and fleshed out in jury instructions. But this
does not seem to have happened: the inadequacy and vagueness of
jury instructions on "proximate cause" is notorious. As a result,
there is little trace in the case law of what legal concerns the issue
of the scope of liability for consequences raises. Here, the academy
can play a vital role in support of the Reporters by diversifying its
interests from historical studies of the past evolution of broad doc-
trine and from the elucidation of abstract theories of liability to in-
vestigation of the diverse range of legal concerns that provide the
fine-structure of the law in operation.
113. FRANCIS TRINDADE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 401-02 (3d ed.
1999); id. at n.115 (citing appellate authorities).
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VIII. THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES OF
TORTIOUS CONDUCT: THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE
A. Foreseeability of Some Risk Associated with the Tortious Conduct
as a Necessary Requirement of the Incidence of Obligation;
Distinguished from Foreseeability as a Necessary Requirement of the
Scope of Liability for Consequences
If we maintain a distinction between the incidence of an ob-
ligation and the scope of liability for consequences of tortious con-
duct, we can see how the idea of foreseeability can operate differ-
ently in each. It is one question whether the law requires as a nec-
essary (but not necessarily sufficient) requirement to the recogni-
tion of a pocket of a tort obligation that the defendant should rea-
sonably have foreseen that his conduct posed some risk of harm" 4
to others. It is a different question whether foreseeability should be
a necessary requirement of the scope of liability for consequences.
Specifically, across the law of torts, a respectable argument can be
made both for and against foreseeability as a necessary require-
ment for the scope of liability for consequences 115
114. This risk of harm would have to be a class of harm that is actionable under that tort.
115. Some sources of these arguments are as follows:
(1) Foreseeability relevant to incidence/tortious conduct and to scope of ability
for consequences: the tort of negligence in a majority of American jurisdictions.
DOBBS, supra note 53, at 458; see supra note 98.
(2) Foreseeability relevant to incidence/tortious conduct but not to scope of li-
ability for consequences: the tort of negligence in jurisdictions accepting In re Po-
lemis. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, 55 N.W.2d 29 (Wis. 1952); in-
fra note 154 (regarding the tort of deceit in the United Kingdom referred to by Lord
Steyn). The modern argument here is that, as between the innocent victim and the
defendant whose conduct has at least been wrongful with regard to some foreseeable
risk, it should be the latter who bears the risk of (some) unforeseeable consequences
of his tortious conduct. See HART & HONOR9, supra note 3, at 259-75; FLEMING, su.
pra note 98, at 233, 238-39.
(3) Incidence and tortious conduct do not require foreseeability but scope of
liability for consequences of that tortious conduct does require foreseeability: the
modern British interpretation of Rylands v. Fletcher. See Cambridge Water Co. v.
Eastern Counties Leather Plc, [1994] 2 A.C. 264 (H.L); cf. Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp.,
810 P.2d 917, 925 (Wash. 1991) (holding that under strict liability for hazardous ac-
tivity the defendant was relieved of liability if the way the consequence came about
was "unforeseeable in relation to the extraordinary risk created by the activity"),
amended by 817 P.2d 1359 (Wash. 1991); see also PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra noto
57, §§ 2(a), 15 (regarding strict products liability for manufacturing errors). But see
William J. Powers, A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 639, 668-72 (advocating a hindsight test for the scope of liability for
consequences issue by "identifying the risks that we now use to determine that the
product is defective and then asking whether the plaintiffs injury was one of those
risks").
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In the tort of negligence, foreseeability of some harm to oth-
ers is an inherent requirement of the incidence of the obligation.11 6
In relation to the scope of liability for consequences in this tort,
there has been a move across all common law jurisdictions this cen-
tury towards requiring foreseeability (of the kind/type/nature of the
harm suffered) as a necessary requirement.11 7 Yet in the United
States, as elsewhere, the majority adoption of this rule has had an
unfortunate effect on the approach to the general field of the scope
of liability for consequences. The idea that foreseeability is a neces-
sary requirement for the scope of liability for consequences in negli-
gence tends to be conflated with the separate idea that the defen-
dant should be liable for all such consequences of his tortious con-
duct.118 The arguments supporting the former idea 19 do not extend
to support the latter. 120
B. The Untenable Idea that Foreseeability is a Sufficient
Requirement to Bring a Consequence Within the Scope of Liability
for Consequences in Negligence
This becomes critical when we consider non-traditional neg-
ligence claims where, for example, the claim is that the defendant
failed to control a third party. While the idea that foreseeability is a
sufficient requirement to bring a consequence within the scope of
liability for consequences may be tolerable in the traditional case
where the conduct resulting in the physical harm was the positive
act of the defendant himself, it becomes grossly over-inclusive when
claims in relation to omissions are made. For example, if a prison
(4) Foreseeability irrelevant to incidenceltortious conduct and irrelevant to
scope of liability for consequences: the tort of defamation in the United Kingdom.
Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 343 (Eng. C.A.).
116. See supra text accompany notes 101-03.
117. See discussion supra note 98.
118. See DOBBS, supra note 53, at 454. At two points in the Second Restatement, Presser
suggested that in the tort of negligence mere satisfaction of the foreseeability criterion was suffi-
cient to bring a consequence within the "scope of the risk," see infra notes 125, 129, 136-37 and
accompanying text (regarding this phrase), and therefore of liability, RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 442B cmt e (1965) ("[Clriminal acts may themselves be foreseeable, and so within the
scope of the created risk") (emphasis added); id. § 442B cmt. b C'[A]ny harm which is in itself
foreseeable, as to which the actor has created or increased the recognizable risk, is always
'proximate' ").
119. See Arthur L Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 YALE
L.J. 449 (1930); Fleming James, Jr., Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761 (1951); Warren A. Seavey,
Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COLUNM. L. REV. 20, 34 (1939) ("Prima facie at least,
the reasons for creating liability should limit it.").
120. Cf. HART & HONOR, supra note 3, at 254-84 (comparing the doctrine that only foresee-
able harm is recoverable with the doctrine that all foreseeable harm is recoverable).
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guard in a maximum security prison carelessly falls asleep on duty,
allowing hardened criminals to escape, it is foreseeable that many
people may become victims of the crimes of the escapees, not just
during their escape but for the indefinite future while they remain
at large. None of our systems of common law would seek to make
the guard liable for all the crimes committed by the escapees.121
Of course, one technique by which this truncation of legal li-
ability for the stream of consequences of tortious conduct might be
achieved is a no-duty holding in relation, say, to victims of crimes
committed after a certain date. Initially, this route would seem to
carry the disadvantage of signaling that prison guards owe only
some members of the public a duty of care in relation to their
safety. Such a signal of discrimination between citizens is distaste-
ful in traditional cases and may also be regarded as such in certain
non-traditional cases like the prison guard case. 122 If so, the signal
can be avoided if this limit of liability is packaged in terms of all
citizens being equally owed the duty of care, but that the scope of
liability for consequences of tortious conduct of the duty is severely
limited; and that, in light of the balance of explicated legal con-
cerns, including the perceived particular purpose of the pocket of
obligation, the liability does not extend to all the foreseeable risks
of the tortious conduct. This more palatable packaging, however,
requires rejection of the idea that in the tort of negligence the de-
fendant should be liable for all the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of his tortious conduct.
The scope of liability for foreseeable consequences can also
be controlled on the basis of the type of consequence with which the
scope of the obligation is concerned. For example, the law might
choose to limit the liability of the manufacturer of a security bolt,
which fails and allows a door to swing open, to encompass only
thefts and not to encompass the foreseeable consequence that the
open door might catch in the wind and damage itself on the struc-
ture to which it is attached. 12 3 But, as I argue later,124 this is not
121. For a characteristically illuminating treatment of some of these cases, see Robertson,
Negligence Liability, supra note 3, at 157-62. For a comparison from the United Kindgom, see
Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004 (H.L.).
122. On the distastefulness of a legal signal that classifies people as to whether they are en-
titled to physical protection in traditional cases, see supra notes 30, 33; infra note 155. The issue
may be seen differently in non-traditional cases even where the injury is physical, such as the
failure to control others. For example, consider the law's recognition of a duty on commercial
hosts to act reasonably when serving alcohol to patrons but its refusal to recognize such a duty
on social hosts. See supra note 104.
123. The Restatement (Second) addresses this issue:
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the same as saying that the duty is only owed with respect to one
risk, which in my view is an incoherent approach. We should see
the duty to act reasonably as either owed or not owed in the cir-
cumstances and we should not partition duty according to risks so
that a defendant is under a duty with respect to one risk and not
with respect to another. Similarly, whether the duty was breached
depends on whether the defendant acted as a reasonable person
would have acted. Breach also should not be partitioned according
to risks so that a defendant must act as a reasonable person with
regard to one risk but not with regard to another. The most analyti-
cally coherent location for the law to draw distinctions betveen
those consequences of unreasonable conduct (i.e., in breach of the
duty of care) for which liability attaches and those in relation to
which liability does not attach is the analytical element focussed
specifically on the scope of liability for consequences. Here, parti-
tioning of risks can be drawn explicitly and coherently.
Later discussion will explain how the statement of the fore-
seeability rule applying to the scope of liability for consequences in
the Restatement (Second) is cryptic and confused.'2 At this point, it
is enough to recommend that the treatment of this rule in the Re-
statement (Third) should allow a distinction to be drawn between
types of foreseeable consequences, thereby facilitating the man-
agement of non-traditional claims. It should make clear that the
law may well draw the scope of liability for consequences much
more narrowly than simply within the scope of the foreseeable risks
of tortious conduct. Moreover, in light of the increase in non-
traditional claims, the Restatement (Third) should abandon the
earlier suggestion that truncation of liability more narrowly than
The hazard problem .... In some cases the duty to refrain from certain con-
duct may be established solely to protect the other from the risk of harm arising
from one particular hazard. As to harm resulting from that hazard, the conduct
is negligent. Thus in some situations the locking of a securely closed door may
be required only for the purpose of protecting goods within the room or building
from the risk of theft.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. e (1965).
124. See discussion infra Part VIII.D.
125. In particular, one example is the "scope of the risk" or "hazard" approach so evident in
Prosser's parts of the Restatement (Second). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 281 cmts. e-h,
430 cmt. c, 435 cmt. c, 442B, 442B cmts. b, c, 449 & cmt. a, 457 cmts. b, d (1965). For its appear-
ance in Wade's text, see, for example, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519(2), 519 cmt. e,




the scope of foreseeable risks should only rarely be recognized by
law. 1 26
Of course, the foreseeability rule applying to the scope of li-
ability for consequences in the tort of negligence does not apply in
all other torts. This is yet another reason why sections on general
tort principles should be clearly separated from those relating to
specific torts.
C. The Scope of Liability for Consequences Does not Cover a
Foreseeable Risk if it is One a Reasonable Person Would not have
Done More to Avoid than the Defendant Did
It is a well-known gloss on the foreseeability rule that it is
only foreseeability of the kind/type/nature of the harm suffered that
is a necessary requirement for the scope of liability for conse-
quences in the tort of negligence. 127 Another critical gloss on the
foreseeability rule for the scope of liability for consequences is em-
bedded in Dobbs' neat statement that "the great majority of cases
hold negligent defendants liable only for harm of the same general
kind that they should have reasonably foreseen and should have
acted to avoid."128 Often it is sought to capture this nuance by call-
ing the foreseeability rule "the risk rule" or "the scope of the risk"
rule. 129 It also prompts cryptic comments such as: "the defendant is
not liable for foreseeable harms unless the risk of such harms was
one of the reasons for judging him to be negligent in the first
place"'130 and "foreseeability is a short-hand expression intended to
say that the scope of the defendant's liability is determined by the
scope of the risk he negligently created."'131
But these statements can be misleading. Consider the last-
quoted statement. To say that the scope of liability for consequences
in negligence is determined by the scope of the risk the defendant
negligently "created" is ambiguous. Negligent conduct can "create"
a consequence, in the sense of being a necessary factor in the his-
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 16, tit. B, Introductory Note (1965) ("Only a few of
the Sections in this Topic state rules which restrict liability short of holding the actor liable] for
all the harm of which his negligence is a substantial cause .... [T]he restrictive rules are in
almost every instance stated as being exceptions to rules which permit recovery .... "); id. §§ 5, 9
cmt. b, 431.
127. See supra note 98.
128. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 453 (emphasis added).
129. See supra notes 118, 125; infra notes 136-137.
130. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 463 n.1.
131. Id. at 463.
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tory of that consequence, and yet that consequence can fall outside
the appropriate scope of liability for consequences because the con-
sequence was unforeseeable. In other words, when the defendant's
tortious conduct was historically necessary for the consequence,
then, with hindsight, we know that it did not merely pose the risk132
of that consequence but completed the conditions that brought it
about. In the context of those other conditions, the tortious conduct,
in a sense, "created" that consequence. Yet if that consequence was
unforeseeable, it will fall outside the appropriate scope of liability
for consequences under the foreseeability rule.
The nuance these expressions are trying to capture is that
the scope of liability for consequences does not extend to cover a
foreseeable risk if it is one that a reasonable person would have
done no more to avoid than the defendant did because, for example,
a reasonable person would not foresee that risk as being increased
by the defendant's tortious conduct or would have regarded the
foreseeable increase in risk as trivial. For example, 133 take the fore-
seeable risk of slipping on a sidewalk:
If a defendant [is obliged] to direct me where I should go and, at a crossroads, di-
rects me to the left road rather than the right [and correct] road, what happens to
me on the left road is, in a sense, the result of what the defendant has done ....
But ... if, being on the left road, I slip and fall, the fact alone that it was the de-
fendant's direction, in breach [of obligation], which put me there will not, without
more, make the defendant liable for my broken leg.34
132. The concept of risk only plays a role in our understanding of the world where there are
gaps in our knowledge.
133. Another well-known example that could be (though is not usually) explained in the fol-
lowing terms:
A gives a loaded pistol to B, a boy of eight, to carry to C. In handing the pistol
to C the boy drops it, injuring the bare foot of D, his comrade. The fall dis-
charges the pistol, wounding C. A is subject to liability to C, but not to D.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt f illus. 3 (1965); see also, e.g., Wright, Causa-
tion, supra note 3, at 1771-74 (discussing such scenarios).
Here we could explain the outcome on the basis that the handing over of the gun would have
seemed careless to an observer at the time because it seemed to increase the risk of wounding by
gunshot but would not have seemed to increase the risk of an injury from a dropped object (un-
less, for example, the gun was exceptionally heavy).
Similarly, take two cases where the victim of a careless driver is injured en route to hospital
in an ambulance when it is (a) struck by lightning, see supra text accompanying note 112, (b)
driven into a tree when the ambulance driver has a heart attack, see Pridham v. Cash & Carry
Bldg. Ctr., Inc., 359 A.2d 193 (N.H. 1976). A critical difference is that whereas at the time of the
tortious conduct there would have been some reason to foresee that it exposed the victim to an
(albeit remote) increased risk of being further injured by the human weaknesses of those who
would transport him to medical assistance, there was no reason to foresee that the tortious con-
duct had increased the risk of death by lightning.
134. Alexander v. Cambridge Credit Corp. Ltd. (1987) 9 N.S.W.L.R. 310, 333; see also Chap-
pel v. Hart (1998) 156 A.L.R. 517, discussed in Jane Stapleton, Scientific and Legal Approaches
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It would not have appeared to a reasonable person at the time of
the advice-giving that the risk of slipping on the left was any
greater than that of slipping on the right. Thus, a reasonable per-
son would not have taken any more steps to avoid it than the de-
fendant took (here, none). It was not reasonably foreseeable that
the defendant's tortious conduct would make the plaintiffs pros-
pects worse (though that was, in fact, the case as we now know with
hindsight).
It is not feasible to accommodate this important nuance and
to filter out liability for such consequences at any other analytical
stage (e.g., the breach stage) than that of the scope of liability for
consequences. It is therefore crucial that this nuance be reflected in
the statement of the foreseeability rule governing this analytical
stage of the scope of liability for consequences. This was not done in
the earlier Restatements.135 Nor is it adequately captured by the
sort of cryptic statements cited above. It is preferable to be explicit
and so the Restatement (Third) should clearly state the crystallized
foreseeability rule applying to the scope of liability for consequences
as a rule that the consequence must be one of that array of foresee-
able risks that a party under a duty of care should have done more
to avoid than the defendant did.
D. The Incoherence of Owing a Duty to Act Carefully in Relation to
Only One Foreseeable Risk
One of the incoherences that cryptic "scope of the risk"
phrases can generate, especially in earlier Restatements, is the idea
that in some cases it is the risk of a particular hazard that "makes
to Causation, in CAUSATION IN LAW AND MEDICINE (Danuta Mendelson & Ian Freckolton eds.,
2001).
135. In the Restatement (Second), Prosser stated that "any harm which is in itself foresee.
able, as to which the actor has created or increased the recognizable risk, is always 'proximate.'"
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B cmt. b.
Yet this statement is ambiguous: Does the person giving directions "create" / "increase" the
risk of the pavement injury because with hindsight we know that the person would not have
been injured if the right directions had been given? In contrast, did Prosser instead implicitly
mean what was required was that, judged at the time, the defendant's conduct appeared to create
a risk that the victim did not seem otherwise to face (or appeared to increase the level of a risk
that the victim seemed otherwise to face)? This ambiguity, which commonly arises when the
idea of creating/increasing a risk is used without being clearly linked to the notion of foresight in
a context of ignorance, see supra note 132, is evident throughout the Restatement (Second), see,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435A cmt. a, 438 cmt. a, 442A cmt. b, 449 cmt. a.
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the actor negligent"136 or in relation to which the duty was created
"solely to protect" against. 137 This, then, supports the conclusion
that such a consequence is within the appropriate scope of liability
for consequences under the rule. But this is an incoherent, or even
circular, idea. It might make sense if we had decided to enfold all
the traditional elements of the tort back into one single finely speci-
fied duty, one that specifies the consequence that it was "created
solely to protect" against. But we would thereby lose the advan-
tages of our separate analytical elements. Specifically, we would
lose the value of the separate "scope of liability for consequences"
enquiry which is, to paraphrase a statement in Professor Kelley's
classic article in this area: "[When is breach of a community stan-
dard that harms plaintiff nevertheless not a personal wrong to the
plaintiff?" 138 In any case, the earlier Restatements do not embrace
the "collapsed," "enfolded" vision of an obligation but state that "le-
gal cause" consists, inter alia, of "rules restricting responsibility" 13 9
for consequences that would otherwise be generated by the other
elements of the tort. While this "devolved" pattern of discrete ele-
ments remains, a duty of care in the tort of negligence cannot co-
herently be seen as directed solely to protect against only one spe-
cific foreseeable outcome. 140
Where it is recognized, a duty of care reflects the judgment
that, in view of the context the parties were in at the time, includ-
ing the dangers that seemed attendant thereupon, the defendant is
obliged to conduct himself as a reasonable person would. For exam-
ple, because it is foreseeable in the most general way that a per-
son's positive act might result in some type of physical injury to an-
other, and because the law wants to signal the high value society
places on a person's physical security, the law subjects us all to the
traditional duty to conduct ourselves reasonably so as to avoid
physically injuring others. The obligation imposed by a duty of care
here is to act as a reasonable person would to avoid any type of
136. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449; see also id. §§ 448 cnt. c, 451(b). Contrast this
with the competing idea in the Restatentent that all foreseeable risks posed by the tortious con-
duct are within the "scope of the risk." See supra note 118. On the "scope of the risk' idea, see
generally supra note 125.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. e.
138. Kelley, supra note 3, at 91.
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465 cmt. b (stating that these rules are set out
in sections 435-61, while rules concerning the other aspect of "legal cause," namely "substantial
factor," are set out in sections 432-33).
140. Contrast this with strict liabilities where the incidence of the obligation may well be
sensibly limited in this way and linked to a correspondingly defined range of consequences.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (1977).
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foreseeable physical harm to others141-no more, and certainly no
less. The idea that the obligation is to act reasonably only in rela-
tion to one of the array of foreseeable risks is, in our devolved ana-
lytical regime, an incoherent one in theory and certainly extraordi-
narily awkward as a guide to conduct.142 How odd it is to say that
the purpose of the legal rule that I must drive carefully, and the
resultant instruction to me in regard to my conduct, is to avoid the
risk that I will break your leg; to avoid the risk that your leg may
be treated negligently in the hospital; but not to avoid the risk that
it might be treated maliciously. The Restatement (Third) should
reflect this point.
E. "Freakish/Indirect" Outcomes
Historically, in the case law on the tort of negligence, there
have been two alternative general rules of law regarding the scope
of liability for consequences. The directness rule extends to all out-
comes, even if not foreseeable, so long as they are the "direct" result
of the tortious conduct. The more popular modern rule is that of
foreseeability: freakish, "unforeseeable" outcomes are outside the
scope of liability. Though it is widely acknowledged that in practice
both approaches produce, or can be made to produce, the same re-
141. Outside this continent of obligation (i.e., outside the traditional running down-typo
case), of course, the incidence of the obligation of care is episodic: only a few pockets/islands of
duty of affirmative action to avoid physical harm; a very few pockets/islands of duty to avoid
pure nervous shock; and a very few pockets/islands of duty to avoid economic loss. See supra
notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
142. Failure to act as a reasonable person is "what makes the actor negligent." A reasonable
person would not speed in a built-up area, so such conduct is a breach of this obligation (that is,
it is tortious conduct). It is then a separate question to ask for which of the physical conse-
quences of that tortious conduct the driver should be liable. Should he be liable, for example, for
the inappropriate medical treatment given to his victim? See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 454 cmt. c, 457 (1965). Once it has been recognized that the defendant had been under a duty
of care, the test of tortious conduct, of breach, is what a reasonable person would have done in all
the circumstances. It is because the law then has special explicable reasons to limit the liability
of defendants-such as that of the prison guard and of the manufacturer of the security bolt in
earlier examples, see supra notes 121, 123 and accompanying text-to only some consequences of
tortious conduct that it is useful to have a separate element of the cause of action: because it
allows these special explicable reasons to be showcased. A collapsed/enfolded analytical ar-
rangement prevents this. Moreover, such an arrangement may appear to present a ludicrous
instruction to future drivers: that the motorist must approach driving under a duty to avoid
producing injuries by his negligence that will be treated negligently by the later medical team,
but owes no duty to avoid producing those injuries that will be treated recklessly by the medical
team! A separate "scope of liability for consequences" category does not purport to give such
messages to guide future behavior. See DOBBS, supra note 53, at 447.
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sults' 4 in most cases, it tends to be the conventional doctrinal wis-
dom that the foreseeability rule generates a narrower scope of li-
ability. The reason why this is misleading is important because it
illustrates the close nexus between the legal concerns relevant to
the scope of liability for consequences in an individual case and the
legal concerns relevant to the recognition of that pocket of obliga-
tion. Moreover, it shows how this relationship, rather than the
vague general concepts of foreseeability or directness, governs legal
outcomes in this area.
Take injuries resulting from lightning. In one sense, these
seem freakish and random injuries that are impossible to foresee.
Moreover, any nexus to human conduct would, at most, seem "indi-
rect." Yet there are contexts in which the law of negligence allows
liability for such consequences: manufacturers whose lightning rods
fail to work, careless installers of lightning rods,144 golf course op-
erators who fail to warn or otherwise protect their customers, 1 5 etc.
Even the Restatement (Second) records such an example of liability
for lightning injuries.146
What this shows is that what is critical to the law is not
some independent general quality of an outcome, the foreseeability
or directness of its type/manner/extent, all of which can be ma-
nipulated to cover virtually any result that is desired on other
grounds. What is critical is the nexus to the reasons the law has for
imposing the obligation on the particular defendant in the first
place. Certainly one of those reasons may be that, over time, a re-
peat-player such as a golf course owner should anticipate the risks
143. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 264 (1999); Kelley, supra note 3, at 52, 94; Powers,
Reputology, supra note 3, at 1948. This can be effected, for example, by the manipulation of the
ideas of the type, manner and extent of harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281 cmt.
f, 435(1), 435 cmt. b (1965). The Restatement (Second) itself shifts between concepts of foresee-
ability, risks that were "recognizable" or "not highly extraordinary," and consequences that can
be characterized with hindsight as "normal and ordinary? See, e.g., id. §§ 281 crots. e-g, 435,
442(c), 443 & cmt. b, 444-46, 447, 460; see infra note 159.
144. White v. Schnoebelen, 18 A.2d 185, 185-88 (N.H. 1941) (regarding scenario where, care-
lessly installed in 1930, fire results from lightning strike of a rod in 1937).
145. See generally Michael N. Shadiack, Note, Torts-Act of God-Does a Golf Course Owner
and/or Operator Owe a Duty of Care to their Patrons to Protect Them front Lightning Strikes?
Maussner v. Atlantic City Country Club, Inc., 691 A.2d 826 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), 8
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 301 (1998).
146. The Restatement (Second) provides a hypotheticah
A negligently fails to clean petroleum residue out of his oil barge moored at a
dock, thus creating the risk of harm to others in the vicinity through fire or ex-
plosion of gasoline vapor. The barge is struck by lightning and explodes, injur-
ing B, a workman on the dock. A is subject to liability to B.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B cmt. a, illus. 1; see also Johnson v. Kosmos Portland
Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193, 196 (6th Cir. 1933).
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of lightning. But other factors also come into play. For example, the
commercial representations of the lightning rod manufacturer and
installer trigger classic legal concerns in favor of the imposition of
such a duty of care. Similarly, the profit motivation of the golf
course might be thought to justify not only the recognition of a duty
of care to entrants but a wider scope of liability on it than on the
owner of an equally popular beauty spot to which the owner allows
free access.
In other words, the legal concerns raised by the position of
the parties at the time of tortious conduct may justify not only the
recognition of an obligation on the defendant (for example, in the
tort of negligence, to conduct himself as a reasonable person would)
but also justify a scope of liability for tortious conduct which ex-
tends to encompass outcomes that might generally be described as
freakish acts of nature. 147
A consideration of other torts reinforces the point that the
legal reasons for recognizing a pocket of obligation under a par-
ticular tort also affect the scope of liability for consequences. Thus,
the injurious intentions of a person towards his victim may not only
form part of the reason for the incidence of a tort, but also the view
that a wholly freakish and "indirect" injury to the victim flowing
from the wrongdoer's conduct is within the scope of liability for con-
sequences of that tort.148
F. Intervening Conduct of a Third Party
The dependence of the scope of liability for consequences on
the perceived purpose of the liability as a whole is particularly evi-
dent in situations where emphasis is placed on the conduct of a
third party who also played a role in the history of the plaintiffs
injury. Even where this intervention was a tortious or even crimi-
nal act, the injury might still be within the appropriate scope of li-
ability of a defendant, something the Restatement (Second) itself
147. Their outcomes may also be generally described as "indirect." For an amusing example
of how easily notions of foreseeability, directness, type, manner and extent of harm can be ma-
nipulated, see United Novelty Co. v. Daniels, 42 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1949). There, an employee
was cleaning a machine with gasoline when a rat ran into a near-by furnace, returned in flames
to the vicinity of the employee causing the machine to explode. Id. at 395-96. The employer was
held liable for this consequence. Id. at 396.
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435A cmt. a, 435B; supra note 108; infra notes
154, 170 and accompanying text. Regarding the wrongfulness of others, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 442(e), (f), and for useful citations, see infra note 149.
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contemplated. 149 For example, the law's concern with freedom of
action protects an ordinary citizen from the imposition of any duty
to attempt to control a person assaulting the victim in a night-club
(even if such an attempt was what a reasonable person would do),
whereas other legal concerns may well justify the recognition of a
duty to behave reasonably on the security staff of the club. 150
Again, what is doing the work here is not some independent
quality or characterization of the intervening conduct of the assail-
ant, as the vague, overlapping, and circular Restatement provisions
on interventions would suggest, 151 but the legal concerns arising out
of the context in which the parties interacted, including the implied
representation by the night-club that it would exercise reasonable
care in relation to the physical security of its patrons.
Conversely, the balance of legal concerns raised by the facts
of the case may be judged to pull in the direction of the consequence
falling outside the appropriate scope of liability. For example, take
the following case: the careless defendant inadvertently leaves a
knife in the glove box of his unlocked vehicle in a high crime area. A
thug steals the knife and proceeds to hold up a series of stores that
same day, in each case stabbing the proprietor to death. Just as
most jurisdictions now recognize, either by common law rule or
statute, that justice requires the law of negligence to recognize the
relative fault of the plaintiff and defendant, so too there are sound
symbolic reasons why a comparative approach should be taken in
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B cmt. e Cintervening intentionally] tor-
tious or criminal acts [of a third person] may in themselves be foreseeable, and so vthin the
scope of the created risk, in which case the actor may still be liable for the harm ... ."); see also
id. § 281 cmt. e (theft); id. §§ 302B & cmt. d, illus. 2 & cmt. g, illus. 14, 442B cmt. b. According to
sections 447-48 and accompanying comments, whereas, to be within the scope of liability an
"intervening" intentional tort or crime must have been one of which the defendant "should have
realized" the risk, intervening negligence of a third party may still be within the scope of liability
if it was merely a "normal" consequence and not "extraordinary" or "altogether unusual." The
practical significance of these different shades of terminological meaning is debatable. See supra
note 143.
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A. However, care must be taken to avoid
pace-setting obligations. See supra note 28.
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 442-53; id § 439 (regarding the circular notion
of testing whether conduct is operative by whether it is "actively operating"); Terry Christlieb,
Note, Why Superseding Cause Analysis Should be Abandoned, 72 TEX. L REV. 161, 182-85
(1993). More generally, a particularly insidious aspect of the structure of the Restatement in the
area of legal cause is the separation in treatment between the type of harm involved in the con-
sequence, the manner in which it came about, and the intervention of other "forces In fact,
most disputes about the scope of liability for a particular consequence can be couched in any of
these ways. DOBBS, supra note 53, at 452. So, in my opinion, the implication to be drawn from
the structure of the Restatement that separate categorization is feasible, coherent, and appropri-
ate is dangerously misleading.
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relation to the relative blameworthiness of the defendant's lapse of
care and the murderous intervening conduct of the thief. Relative to
the thief s role in the history of the deaths, the law might judge the
role of the defendant's tortious conduct to be of peripheral impor-
tance given its concern to give a focussed moral and deterrent mes-
sage. 152 To include the deaths within the scope of the motorist's le-
gal liability, even if it is plausible to describe them as foreseeable,
may be thought to dilute that message too much by spreading the
responsibility for the series of heinous crimes too widely.
The Third Restatement should attempt to spell out these
types of concerns to enable them to be used, where appropriate on
the facts, in counsels' argument before, and in a trial judge's in-
structions to, the jury.
G. Attenuation/Lapse of Time; Coincidence; and Bad Luck
Finally, the project to help the Reporters by unpacking the
slogans infecting the law on the scope of liability for consequences
must tackle the hackneyed and unhelpful notion that, over time,
"the effect of an actor's conduct ... may ... become so attenuated
as to be insignificant and unsubstantial as compared to the aggre-
gate of the other factors which have contributed."'153 I have already
explained that it is only in light of the purpose of the enquiry that
we can rank historical factors leading to an outcome in the order of
their "significance." We also know that the passage of time and dis-
tance in space do not themselves deprive tortious conduct of its sig-
nificance for the attribution of legal responsibility. The careless
breach of the manufacturer of the faulty lightning rod will be just
as significant in this respect whether the rod's failure results in the
destruction of a house almost immediately after supply or years
later, whether the house is nearby or on the other side of the coun-
try.
What is doing the work behind the label of attenuation, I
would argue, is the law's concern with the unfairness of imposing
responsibility for compounded bad luck. Take the following exam-
ple. Before leaving on vacation, the defendant farmer carelessly
152. See Stapleton, Peripheral Parties, supra note 24, at 310-17. United States case law ro.
flects this legal concern with the relative culpability of the intervening conduct and the tortious
conduct. See David E. Seidelson, Some Reflections on Proximate Cause, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 23-27
(1980) (discussing Watson v. Ky. & Ind. Bridge & R.R. Co., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910)).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 cmnt. f; see also Cooter, supra note 3, at 529
('Causation can be called a 'decaying transitive relation'....").
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leaves an insecticide by his front gate where his neighbor's dog is
able to, and later does, eat it. The dog gradually becomes listless,
but the harried neighbor does not notice for some weeks. When he
does notice, he reasonably believes that the dog will pick up if he is
forced to exercise strenuously. After some weeks of this regime, the
dog is no better. With difficulty, for it is harvest time, the neighbor
arranges for a visiting friend to take the dog to a vet in a nearby
town. En route, the reckless friend gets lost on the narrow, unfa-
miliar roads and arrives after the vet has closed for the day. The
neighbor re-arranges for the friend to try again the next week. The
vet reports that the dog has probably been poisoned by a powerful
insecticide and recommends a serum that is immediately ordered
from the nearest supplier. The arrival of the serum is delayed many
weeks by a labor dispute at the post office and by the negligence of
the delivery personnel. The serum is administered, but just too late,
and the dog dies of the effects of the insecticide.
These are facts that might, perhaps, attract a description in
terms of the farmer's inadvertent1 54 tortious conduct (his breach of
duty to act as a reasonable person when acting positively) being so
"attenuated" as to be insignificant compared to the aggregate of
other factors that have contributed. Yet each other factor in the
story was foreseeable and non-fleakish. Each could simply be de-
scribed as bad luck. Defendants are often held liable for a coinci-
dence of bad luck that completes the history linking his tortious
conduct with the outcome. But the legal concern underlying the at-
tenuation tag is that, where there is an extended sequence of these
factors that combine to compound severely the degree of coincidence
and bad luck, it would be unfair to hold the defendant liable for the
outcome. There comes a point, in other words, in relation to ex-
tremes of bad luck where the law refuses to intervene to shift
154. Of course, if the defendant farmer had intended the dog to die, the sequence can no
longer be smoothly described as "bad luck," as he achieved his bad purpose. This is one of the
threads by which the more extensive scope of legal liability for intended consequences can be
rationalized. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 148; infra note 170. For discussion of the
early surreptitious identification of the moral blameworthiness of the defendant as a factor rele-
vant to the issue of the scope of liability for consequences, see Kelley, supra note 3, at 59. This is
a theme of the law in other common law jurisdictions. See, e.g., McFarlane v. Tayside Health
Bd., [2000] 2 A-C. 59, 82-83 (H.L). In Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v'. Scrinigeour VTekers
(Asset Management) Ltd., [1997] A-C. 254 (H.L.), the House of Lords differentiated between the
measure of damages for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. Pointing out that tort law
and morality are inextricably interwoven, I said (with the agreement of Lord Keith of Kinkel and
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle) that as between the fraudster and the innocent party, moral con-
siderations militate in favor of requiring the fraudster to bear the risk of misforlunes directly
caused by the fraud. Id. at 280B-C.
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losses. 55 In relation to vulnerability to suffering loss from such ex-
tremes, the law judges it best to leave us all in the same boat.
Now we can see the indirect relevance that lapse of time can
have in a case concerning the scope of liability for consequences: the
longer the lapse, the more coincidences of bad luck might occur, all
of which are necessary to the history linking the tortious conduct to
the outcome.
IX. PARALLELS WITH DUTY DEBATE
As a final point, I will draw a few parallels between the duty
debate and the scope of liability for consequences project I have
been promoting. As I have defined them, non-traditional claims in
the tort of negligence are ones that do not fit the simple formula of
"the careless (positive) act of a private defendant resulting in physi-
cal injury to the plaintiff." The rise of non-traditional claims, such
as omission cases, highlights a range of concerns with the state of
doctrine in the area described in earlier Restatements as "legal
cause." Many of these have parallels with problems that non-
traditional claims are also highlighting in relation to the incidence
of obligations: In both areas, there is a need to recognize the range
of legal concerns in operation, not all of which are helpfully de-
scribed as ones of policy, and to examine the (often inadequately
reasoned) case law closely so that the specific legal concerns that
have influenced and should influence the law and jury determina-
tions can be spelt out.
In particular, just as there is a need to spell out the concerns
countervailing to the recognition of a pocket of obligation, say a
pocket of the duty of care in negligence, 156 there is a need to spell
out the concerns supporting the confinement of the scope of liability
for consequences. The treatment of legal cause in earlier Restate-
155. This is probably also a useful way to look at why the prison guard in the earlier exam-
ple, see supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text, is not liable for every future crime of the
escapees even though these were easily foreseeable. A more adventurous way of expressing the
result might be that it reflects a concern that here people should bear the risk of random crime
equally, because no (potentially socially divisive) distinction should be made by the law between
classes of crime victim on the basis merely of the long-past history of the criminal. See Home
Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1070 (H.L.) (Diplock, L.); see also supra notes 30, 33.
Consider also Lord Hope's view that distributive justice is a legitimate consideration if law is to
be seen as a system of rules which is fair as between one citizen and another. See supra note 12.
156. That concerns are the rich variety of legal concerns weighing in favor of a no-duty hold-
ing. See supra notes 17, 24.
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ments evinced a bias in favor of jury decision-making.' 57 This found
expression in the presumption that, if the tortious conduct qualified
as a substantial factor in producing the outcome, the outcome would
be within the scope of liability unless, exceptionally, 158 a rule of law
operated to restrict liability. It was also reflected by the adoption of
a notion of "normality" of consequence that was judged with hind-
sight. 159 It was further evident in the relegation of the foreseeability
requirement to a minor qualification of the scope of liability for con-
sequences, 160 rather than as the major symbolic definition of the
appropriate maximum reach of the scope of liability for conse-
quences in the tort of negligence. In light of the rise of non-
traditional claims, the Restatement (Third) should take a more
even-handed approach to these issues.
157. It is arguable that this bias was also, at least to some extent, evident in the area of the
incidence of obligation in the tort of negligence by an embrace of the idea of a general duty. See
supra note 8.
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 16, tit. B, Introductory Note ("Only a few of the
Sections in this Topic state rules which restrict liability short of holding the actor [liable] for all
the harm of which his negligence is a substantial cause ... the restrictive rules are in almost
every instance stated as being exceptions to rules which permit recovery...."); id. §§ 5, 9 cmt. b,
431.
159. The idea that the border issue in the scope of liability for consequences is one of the
"normality" of a consequence (being anything short of "highly extraordinary"), and that this is to
be assessed in the light of hindsight, occurs in a number of places. RESTATFMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 281 cmt. e ("harm of a kind normally to be expected"); id. § 281 cmt g ("resort to hind-
sight"); id. § 435 & cmts. d, e (viewing "after the event"); id. § 438 cmt. a (a result that "after it
occurs appear[s]"); id. § 443 cmts. b, c C'[N]ormar is not used... in the sense of what is usual,
customary, foreseeable, or to be expected. It denotes rather the antithesis of abnormal, of ex-
traordinary."). "Normality" is to be judged "in retrospect" that is, "after the evenL" Id. § 447
cmts. c, e. Thus, in preference to the term "foreseeable risk," the more ambiguous terms "recog-
nizable risk" and "recognizable tendency" are often used. Id. §§ 281 cmts. c, f, j, 430 cmt c, 436
cmt. d, 442B cmt. b, 448 cmt. b. The hindsight approach of the Restatement has not been fa-
vored by United States courts. JOHN L DIAMOND ET AL, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 216 (1996)
("Instead of accepting a proximate cause theory based on what is, in hindsight, viewed as ex-
traordinary, courts are embracing the general notion that consequences should be reasonably
foreseeable."); see also supra note 143. Dobbs suggests that the hindsight approach of the Re-
statement (Second) is "no more certain than the foreseeability rule, and it may only be a way of
saying that the exact harm or the manner of its occurrence need not be foreseeable. If it is any-
thing different from this, it seems to lack the moral basis of the foreseeability test.7 DOBBS,
supra note 53, at 452 n.2.
160. See supra note 98. In the Restatement (Sceond), the requirement that the injury was
foreseeable is stated as an exception to the black letter rule that "the fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does
not prevent him from being liable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435. Moreover, the
notion of foreseeability is attenuated to a notion of "normality" assessed with the benefit of hind-
sight. See supra note 159.
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X. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO REPORTERS
The Challenge of Non-Traditional Claims.161 The chal-
lenge of non-traditional claims to tort doctrine should be
addressed directly by the Third Restatement. For exam-
ple, in the tort of negligence, these claims make manifest
that a legal approach to liability based crudely on fore-
seeability or the "scope of the risk" created by the tortious
conduct is too cryptic to provide sufficiently tight control
of liability. Yet if courts are inhibited from controlling
these non-traditional cases under no-obligation rules, it
will become critical to have finely reasoned control else-
where. The academy and practitioners should help the
Reporters establish a fine-tuned understanding of the di-
verse legal concerns that can justify truncation of liabil-
ity for consequences of tortious conduct. There should be
more work on the "unpacking" of the content of "Legal
Cause."
* The Institutional Competition between Judge and Jury.16 2
The institutional competition between judge and jury
needs to be made explicit in the Third Restatement.
Though it is an individual "political" judgment how much
one trusts the competence of the jury, and which norma-
tive issues one prefers to keep free of precedent by allo-
cating them to the discretion of the jury, it is
appropriate 16 and necessary for courts to lay down rules
of law here as well as enunciating legal concerns about
which the jury should receive guidance. There are few le-
gal rules in this area, but they include rules in relation to
evidentiary gaps in the cause-in-fact area, and the rule
governing the outer scope of appropriate liability for con-
sequences. 64 Legal concerns about which the jury should
merely receive guidance are far more numerous and di-
verse. One example is the concern with the unfairness of
holding a merely inadvertent defendant liable for the
consequences of a protracted sequence of bad luck. The
Third Restatement should record and differentiate the
161. See supra Part II.
162. See supra Part III.
163. See Powers, Judge and Jury, supra note 3, at 1712.
164. See supra note 98 (regarding a majority of states).
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few crystallized rules of law here as well as the legal con-
cerns of relevance to jury decision-making.
" General Sections on Cause-in-Fact and Scope of Liability
for Consequences Covering all Torts.' The areas covered
by the term "legal cause" are common to all torts (indeed,
to all obligations). Hence, the Third Restatement should
set out general sections on these matters (within each of
the two recommended Chapters) before dealing with the
specific rules in relation to the different torts such as
negligence and deceit.
* Replace Legal Cause and Associated Terminology.16 6 The
confusion generated by terms such as legal cause, proxi-
mate cause and substantial factor, all exacerbated by the
underlying ambiguity and shifting meaning of causal
language, should be eliminated. To the extent possible,
the issue of fact should be identified and separated from
the normative issues. In particular, the amalgam concept
of legal cause should be reformulated and renamed as
two separate elements of the tort: (1) cause-in-fact; and
(2) scope of liability for consequences of tortious conduct.
" The Cause-in-Fact Chapter.l6 7 Cause-in-Fact should be lo-
cated in a separate Chapter and defined in the Third Re-
statement to ensure that it is a purely factual question.
This can be achieved by requiring that, to qualify as a
cause-in-fact, a factor must be an historic factor-one
that played a role in the history of the outcome in issue.
To establish that the tortious conduct was an historic fac-
tor, the plaintiff must show, if necessary by ignoring the
presence of other (non-preempting1 68) historic factors, that,
but for the tortious conduct, the particular outcome
would not have occurred. The normative issues that the
characteristic problem in over-determined cases present
should not be located in the Cause-in-Fact Chapter, but
165. See supra notes 26-27, 72-74 and accompanying text.
166. See supra Parts VII-X.
167. See supra Part V.
168. Here I am somewhat simplifying the targeted but.for test. See supra text accompanying
notes 42-47; see also supra note 43 (regarding the preemption qualification).
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in the Scope of Liability for Consequences of Tortious
Conduct Chapter. 169
* Normative Rules Relating to Proof of Cause-in Fact.170
Whether a factor played such an historic role depends on
past facts and what would have occurred in certain hypo-
thetical situations. Where the plaintiff faces evidentiary
gaps in relation to either of these, specific legal concerns
(including the perceived purpose of the specific tort obli-
gation) may lead the law to adopt special rules to allevi-
ate such difficulties. These should be set out in the Third
Restatement's Cause-in-Fact Chapter.
* The Scope of Liability for Consequences of Tortious Con-
duct Chapter. Even if the defendant's tortious conduct
played a role in the history of the outcome, the plaintiff
must show that the outcome was a consequence that was
within the appropriate scope of liability for consequences
of the particular cause of action. This is an entirely nor-
mative issue. It should be dealt with in a Chapter sepa-
rate from that dealing with cause-in-fact. Determining
the appropriate scope of liability for consequences re-
quires attention to a number of general legal
rules/principles. For example, in most jurisdictions in the
tort of negligence, these include:
1) That foreseeability (of the kindtype/nature of the
harm suffered) is a necessary requirement for the
scope of liability for consequences; 171
2) That foreseeability is not a sufficient requirement
for this;172
3) That, to be within the scope of liability, a conse-
quence must be one of that array of foreseeable
risks that a party under a duty of care should
have done more to avoid than the defendant
did;173
4) That the conclusion that a consequence is within
the scope of liability cannot coherently be based
169. See supra Part IV.B.1.
170. See supra Part V.A.-B.
171. See supra note 98.
172. See supra Part VIII.B.
173. See supra Part VIII.C.
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on the assertion that the duty was created "solely
to protect" against the risk of that consequence.174
When determining the appropriate scope of liability for
consequences, attention must also be paid to a range of
legal concerns, including the perceived overall purpose of
the specific tort obligation. Examples of legal concerns of
relevance include:
1) The question of whether the law should choose to
impose a requirement that the historically in-
volved tortious conduct was also necessary to the
history of the outcome. Usually the law does not
regard it as appropriate that the scope of a cause
of action extends to a consequence that would
have occurred even in the absence of the defen-
dant's tortious conduct. So usually a threshold re-
quirement before a consequence can be found to
be within the appropriate scope of liability for
consequences is that the tortious conduct satisfy
the test of necessity, the traditional but-for test in
relation to the outcome.
But in certain circumstances of over-
determination (that is, circumstances involving
multiple sufficient historic factors), a considera-
tion of legal concerns specific to such cases 175 may
lead the law not to impose a requirement of ne-
cessity before the consequence can be found to be
within the appropriate scope of liability. In cases
of simultaneous over-determination by tortfea-
sors, 176 this concern has produced a crystallized
rule of law governing liability for the scope of con-
sequences of tortious conduct. Elsewhere, it might
be appropriate to give guidance to the jury about
these relevant concerns.
2) Whether the consequence is wholly "disproportion-
ate" to the degree of wrongfulness involved in the
tortious conduct. 177
174. See supra Part VIII.D.
175. For example, a consideration that the law would be brought into disrepute if the victim
of one tortious hunter was better off in terms of legal entitlement than the victim of two tortious
hunters. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
176. That is, situations that have multiple sufficient historic tortious factors.
177. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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3) Whether wrongful conduct of another party is also
an historic factor in relation to the outcome, espe-
cially: (a) its relative wrongfulness; (b) the nature
of the relationship, if any, between the defendant
and the other party; and (c) the nature of the rela-
tionship, if any, between the defendant and the
victim. 178
4) The role of compounded bad luck and coincidence
in the interval between tortious conduct and out-
come. 179
5) The degree of wrongfulness of the defendant's tor-
tious conduct-for example, whether the defen-
dant was reckless or intended harm to the plain-
tiff.180
6) The seriousness of any intended harm. 181
7) The social costs (including legal administration) of
including such consequences within the scope of
liability. 182
8) The dignity and integrity of the legal system.' 83
9) Whether allowing recovery for such consequences
would encourage fraudulent claims. 84
10)The concern with the freedom of action of the
plaintiffldefendant. 185
11)Any prior dealings between the parties, especially
any specific explicit or implicit undertakings by
the defendant or the plaintiff.8 6
12)Whether the defendant was acting in pursuit of
commercial profit. 187
178. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442(e), (f) (1965); see also Robertson, Negligence
Liability, supra note 3, at 138-39, 144-47.
179. See supra Part VIII.G.
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435A, 435B; see also Pitre v. Opelousas Gen.
Hosp., 530 So.2d 1151, 1158-61 (La. 1988); supra notes 108, 148, 154.
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435B.
182. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 81, § 105 cmts. d, e; see also Pitre, 530 So.2d at
1161.
183. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
184. See Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 81, § 105 cmt. e; supra note 111 and accompa-
nying text.
185. See supra note 17.
186. Such as that which might be implied by the presence of security guard's at a nightclub.
See supra text accompanying notes 150-151.
187. See supra notes 57, 104, 110.
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13)The moral expectations of society of the defen-
dant, etc. 88
14)Whether the injury is physical, or whether it in-
volves some other type of harm (that is, the na-
ture of the interest of the victim affected by the
defendant's tortious conduct).189
15) Whether the defendant had a reasonable opportu-
nity of limiting his liability for the consequence by
an agreed term. 9 0
16)The degree to which, at the time of the defen-
dant's tortious conduct, it was foreseeable to a
prudent party in his/her position that the kind of
risk that actually occurred would arise.
It is important to stress that none of these legal
concerns is a "trump."'191 Similarly, they do not
provide some sort of recipe list. It is even mis-
leading to see them as guidelines, so diverse and
complex are the fact situations in which they will
be raised. They are simply the concerns the law
brings into consideration in the general area.
* Relevant Legal Concerns are Diverse and Not Just "Pol-
icy." 92 The legal concerns relevant to the appropriate
scope of liability for consequences are diverse and not
adequately described merely as ones of policy. The Third
Restatement should make these points clear.
* Abandon Implied Tone in Favor of Liability for Conse-
quences. 93 The widespread introduction of comparative
fault and the rise of non-traditional claims since the Re-
statement (Second) suggest that the Restatement (Third)
should eliminate the earlier tone that consequences of
tortious conduct are within the appropriate scope of li-
ability unless some exceptional reason can be established.
188. See supra note 58.
189. Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So.2d 1151, 1160 (La. 1988); Sir Robin Cooke, Re-
moteness of Damages and Judicial Discretion, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 288, 295-96, 298 (1978).
190. Cooke, supra note 189, at 298.
191. Compare the duty analysis where there are "trumps." See supra note 24, And just as to
pursue a single formulaic "short-cut" test for the duty of care in non-traditional cases is to pursue
a "will-o-the-wisp," see supra note 20, so too should the existence of some formulaic approach to
the scope of liability for consequences be recognized as "illusory," Cooke, supra note 189, at 297.
192. See supra notes 15, 112.
193. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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